The most important part of this cession comprised Upper Alsace and the county of Ferrette, but there were also many other fragments of territory and rights of seigniory involved, besides lordship over various Rhenish cities, such as Rheinfelden, Saeckingen, Lauffenburg, Waldshut and Brisac.  This last named town commanded the route eastward, as Waldshut that to the southeast, and Thann the highway through the Vosges region.

Fifty thousand florins was the price for the property and the claims transferred from Sigismund to Charles.  Ten thousand were to be paid at once, in order to ransom Waldshut from the Swiss.  The remainder was due on September 24th.  On his part, Sigismund specifically recognised the duke’s right to redeem all domains nominally his but mortgaged for the time being, certain estates or seignorial rights having been thus alienated for 150 years.

This territorial transfer was not a sale.  It was a mortgage, but a mortgage with possession to the mortgagee and further restricted by the provision that there could be no redemption unless the mortgager could repay at Besancon the whole loan plus all the outlay made by the mortgagee up to that date.  Instalment payments were expressly ruled out.  The entire sum intact was made obligatory.  Therefore the danger of speedy redemption did not disquiet Charles.  He knew the man he had to deal with.  Sigismund’s lack of foresight and his prodigality were notorious.  There was faint chance that he could ever command the amount in question.  Accordingly, Charles was fairly justified in counting the mortgaged territory as annexed to Burgundy in perpetuity.

Sigismund pocketed his florins eagerly.  Nothing could have been more welcome to him.  But this relief from the pressure of his pecuniary embarrassment did not inspire him with love for the man who held his lost lands.  His sentiments towards Charles were very similar to those of an heir towards a usurer who has helped him in a temporary strait by mulcting him of his natural rights.

As for the emperor, when this transfer of territory was an accomplished fact, he began to take fright at the consequences.  He did not like this intrusion of a powerful French peer into the imperial circle.[8] At the same time he was ready to make him share responsibility in any further difficulties that might arise between Sigismund and the Swiss.

The least skilful of prophets could have foreseen difficulties for Charles on his own account, both foreign and domestic.  His own relations with the Swiss had always been friendly enough, but he had never before been so near a neighbour, while, within the Rhine lands, it was an open question whether the bartered inhabitants were to enjoy or regret their new tie with Burgundy.  The importance of their sentiments was a matter of as supreme indifference to Charles as was danger from the Confederation.  Neither conciliation nor diplomacy was in his thoughts.  He had no conception of the intricacies of the situation.  He counted the landgraviate as definitely his by the treaty of St. Omer as Brabant by heritage or Liege by conquest.