It is fair to say that the disclosure of the true base of the new ordering, as blurted out by M. Clemenceau at that historic meeting, caused little surprise among the initiated.  For there was no reason to assume that he, or, indeed, the bulk of the continental statesmen, were converts to a doctrine of which its own apostle accepted only those fragments which commended themselves to his country or his party.  Had not the French Premier scoffed at the League in public as in private?  Had he not said in the Chamber:  “I do not believe that the Society of Nations constitutes the necessary conclusion of the present war.  I will give you one of my reasons.  It is this:  if to-morrow you were to propose to me that Germany should enter into this society I would not consent."[345]

“I am certain,” wrote one of the ablest and most ardent champions of the League in France, Senator d’Estournelles de Constant—­“I am certain that he [M.  Clemenceau] made an effort against himself, against his entire past, against his whole life, against all his convictions, to serve the Society of Nations.  And his Minister of Foreign Affairs followed him."[346] Exactly.  And as with M. Clemenceau, so it was with the majority of European statesmen; most of them made strenuous and, one may add, successful efforts against their convictions.  And the result was inevitable.

“The governments,” we read in the organ of syndicalists, who had supported Mr. Wilson as long as they believed him determined to redeem his promises—­“the governments have acquiesced in the Fourteen Points....  Hypocrisy.  Each one cherished mental reservations.  Virtue was exalted and vice practised.  The poltroon eulogized heroism; the imperialist lauded the spirit of justice.  For the past month we have been picking up ideas about the worth of the adhesions to the Fourteen Points, and never before has a more sinister or a more odious comedy been played.  Territorial demands have been heaved one upon the other; contempt of the rights of peoples—­the only right that we can recognize—­has been expressed in striking terms; the last restraints have vanished; the masks have fallen."[347]

From every country in Europe the same judgment came pitched in varying keys.  The Italian press condemned the proceedings of the Conference in language to the full as strong as that of the German or Austrian journals.  The Stampa affirmed that those who, like Bissolati, were in the beginning for placing their trust in one of the two coteries at the Conference were guilty of a fatal mistake.  “The mistake lay in their belief in the ideal strivings of one of the parties, and in the horror with which the cupidity of the others was contemplated, whereas both of them were fighting for ... their interests....  In verity France was no less militarist or absolutist than Germany, nor was England less avid than either.  And the proof is enshrined in the peace treaties which have masked the results of their respective victories. Versailles is a Brest-Litovsk, aggravated in the same proportion as the victory of the Entente over Germany, is more complete than was that of Germany over Russia.  Cupidity does not alter its character, even when it seeks to conceal itself under a Phrugian cap rather than wear a helmet."[348]