same American statesmen who in the peace conditions first presented to Count Brockdorff-Rantzau made over the German population of the Saar Valley to France at the end of fifteen years as the fair equivalent of a sum of money payable in gold, and that France at any rate had raised no objection to the barter nor to the principle at the root of it.  They reasoned that if the principle might be applied to one case it should be deemed equally applicable to the other, and that the only persons or states that could with propriety demur to the Anglo-Persian arrangements were those who themselves were not benefiting by similar transactions.

At last the Paris press, laying due weight on the alliance with Britain, struck a new note.  “It seems that these last Persian bargainings offer a theme for conversations between our government and that of the Allies,” one influential journal wrote.[318] At once the amicable suggestion was taken up by the British press.  The idea was to join the Syrian with the Persian transactions and make French concessions on the other.  This compromise would compose an ugly quarrel and settle everything for the best.  For France’s intentions toward the people of Syria were, it was credibly asserted, to the full as disinterested and generous as those of Britain toward Persia, and if the Syrians desired an English-speaking nation rather than the French to be their mentor, it was equally true that the Persians wanted Americans rather than British to superintend and accelerate their progress in civilization.  But instead of harkening to the wishes of only one it would be better to ignore those of both.  By this prudent compromise all the demands of right and justice, for which both governments were earnest sticklers, would thus be amply satisfied.

Our American associates were less easily appeased.  In sooth there was nothing left wherewith to appease them.  Their press condemned the “protectorate” as a breach of the Covenant.  Secretary Lansing let it be known[319] that the United States delegation had striven to obtain a hearing for the Persians at the Conference, but had “lost its fight.”  A Persian, when apprized of this utterance, said:  “When the United States delegation strove to hinder Italy from annexing Fiume and obtaining the territories promised her by a secret treaty, they accomplished their aim because they refused to give way.  Then they took care not to lose their fight.  When they accepted a brief for the Jews and imposed a Jewish semi-state on Rumania and Poland, they were firm as the granite rock, and no amount of opposition, no future deterrents, made any impression on their will.  Accordingly, they had their way.  But in the cause of Persia they lost the fight, although logic, humanity, justice, and the ordinances solemnly accepted by the Great Powers were all on their side.” ...  One American press organ termed the Anglo-Persian accord “a coup which is a greater violation of the Wilsonian Fourteen Points than the Shantung award to Japan, as it makes the whole of Persia a mere protectorate for Britain."[320]