It requires an effort to believe that procrastination was raised to the level of a theory by men whose experience of political affairs was regarded as a guarantee of the soundness of their judgment.  Yet it is an incontrovertible fact that dilatory tactics were seriously suggested as a policy at the Conference.  It was maintained that, far from running risks by postponing a settlement, the Entente nations were, on the contrary, certain to find the ground better prepared the longer the day of reckoning was put off.  Germany, they contended, had recovered temporarily from the Bolshevik fever, but the improvement was fleeting.  The process of decomposition was becoming intenser day by day, although the symptoms were not always manifest.  Lack of industrial production, of foreign trade and sound finances, was gnawing at the vitals of the Teuton Republic.  The army of unemployed and discontented was swelling.  Soon the sinister consequences of this stagnation would take the form of rebellions and revolts, followed by disintegration.  And this conjunction would be the opportunity of the Entente Powers, who could then step in, present their bills, impose their restrictions, and knead the Teuton dough into any shape they relished.  Then it would be feasible to prohibit the Austrian-Germans from ever entering the Republic as a federated state.  In a word, the Allied governments need only command, and the Teutons would hasten to obey.  It is hardly credible that men of experience in foreign politics should build upon such insecure foundations as these.  It is but fair to say the Conference rejected this singular program in theory while unintentionally carrying it out.

Although everybody admitted that the liquidation of the world conflict followed by a return to normal conditions was the one thing that pressed for settlement, so intent were the plenipotentiaries on preventing wars among unborn generations that they continued to overlook the pressing needs of their contemporaries.  It is at the beginning and end of an enterprise that the danger of failure is greatest, and it was the opening moves of the Allies that proved baleful to their subsequent undertakings.  Germany, one would think, might have been deprived summarily of everything which was to be ultimately and justly taken from her, irrespective of its final destination.  The first and most important operation being the severance of the provinces allotted to other peoples, their redistribution might safely have been left until afterward.  And hardly less important was the despatch of an army to eastern Europe.  Then Germany, broken in spirit, with Allied troops on both her fronts, between the two jaws of a vise, could not have said nay to the conditions.  But this method presupposed a plan which unluckily did not exist.  It assumed that the peace terms had been carefully considered in advance, whereas the Allies prepared for war during hostilities, and for peace during the negotiations.  And they went about this in a leisurely, lackadaisical way, whereas expedition was the key to success.