untoward consequences in the future.  One would like to believe that these misunderstandings were caused by mere slips of the tongue, which should not have been taken literally by those to whom they were addressed; but in the meanwhile they have become not only the source of high, possibly delusive, hopes, but the basis of elaborate policies.  For example, Esthonian and Lettish Ministers were given to understand that they would be permitted to send diplomatic legations to Petrograd as soon as Russia was reconstituted, a mode of intercourse which presupposes the full independence of all the countries concerned.  A constitution was also drawn up for Esthonia by one of the Great Powers, which started with the postulate that each people was to be its own master.  Consequently, the two nations in question were warranted in looking forward to receiving that complete independence.  And if such was, indeed, the intention of the Great Powers, there is nothing further to be said on the score of straightforwardness or precision.  But neither in the terms submitted to Kolchak nor in those to which his Paris agents were asked to give their assent was the independence of either country as much as hinted at.[272]

These may perhaps seem trivial details, but they enable us to estimate the methods and the organizing arts of the statesmen upon whose skill in resource and tact in dealing with their fellows depended the new synthesis of international life and ethics which they were engaged in realizing.  It would be superfluous to investigate the effect upon the Russians, or, indeed, upon any of the peoples represented in Paris, of the Secret Council’s conspirative deliberations and circuitous procedure, which were in such strong contrast to the “open covenants openly arrived at” to which in their public speeches they paid such high tribute.

The main danger, which the Allies redoubted from failure to restore tranquillity in Russia, was that Germany might accomplish it and, owing to her many advantages, might secure a privileged position in the country and use it as a stepping-stone to material prosperity, military strength, and political ascendancy.  This feat she could accomplish against considerable odds.  She would achieve it easily if the Allies unwittingly helped her, as they were doing.

Unfortunately the Allied governments had not much hope of succeeding.  If they had been capable of elaborating a comprehensive plan, they no longer possessed the means of executing it.  But they devised none.  “The fact is,” one of the Conference leaders exclaimed, “we have no policy toward Russia.  Neither do we possess adequate data for one.”

They strove to make good this capital omission by erecting a paper wall between Germany and her great Slav neighbor.  The plan was simple.  The Teutons were to be compelled to disinterest themselves in the affairs of Russia, with whose destinies their own are so closely bound up.  But they soon realized that such a partition is useless as a breakwater against the tidal wave of Teutondom, and Germany is still destined to play the part of Russia’s steward and majordomo.