governments or their substitutes to come into contact with the slayers of their kindred; they would occupy different wings of the hotel at Prinkipo, and never meet their adversaries.  The delegates would see to that.  “Then why should we go there at all if discussion be superfluous?” asked the Russians.  “Because the Allied governments desire to ascertain the condition of Russia and your conception of the measures that would contribute to ameliorate it,” was the reply.  “Prince’s Islands is not the right place to study the Russian situation, nor is it reasonable to expect us to journey thither in order to tell subordinates, who have no knowledge of our country, what we can tell them and their principals in Paris in greater detail and with confirmatory documents.  Moreover, the delegates you have appointed have no qualification to judge of Russia’s plight and potentialities.  They know neither the country nor its language nor its people nor its politics, yet you want us to travel all the way to Turkey to tell them what we think, in order that they should return from Turkey to Paris and report to your Ministers what we said and what we could have unfolded directly to the Ministers themselves long ago and are ready to propound to them to-day or to-morrow.

“The project is puerile and your tactics are baleful.  Your Ministers branded the Bolshevists as criminals, and the French government publicly announced that it would enter into no relations with them.  In spite of that, all the Allied governments have now offered to enter into relations with them.  Now you admit that you made a slip, and you promise to correct it if only we consent to save your face and go on a wild-goose chase to Prinkipo.  But for us that journey would be a recantation of our principles.  That is why we are unable to make it.”

The Prinkipo incident, which began in the region of high politics, ended in comedy.  A number of more or less witty epigrams were coined at the expense of the plenipotentiaries, the scheme, set in a stronger light than it was meant to endure, assumed a grotesque shape, and its promoters strove to consign it as best they could to oblivion.  But the Sphinx question of Russia’s future remained, and the penalties for failure to solve it aright waxed more and more deterrent.  The supreme arbiters had cognizance of them, had, in fact, enumerated them when proclaiming the impossibility of establishing a durable peace or a solid League of Nations as long as Russia continued to be a prey to anarchy.  But even with the prizes and penalties before their eyes to entice and spur them, they proved unequal to the task of devising an intelligent policy.  Fitful and incoherent, their efforts were either incapable of being realized or, when feasible, were mischievous.  Thus, by degrees, they hardened the great Slav nation against the Entente.