The Inside Story of the Peace Conference eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 554 pages of information about The Inside Story of the Peace Conference.

The Inside Story of the Peace Conference eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 554 pages of information about The Inside Story of the Peace Conference.

At the Conference the policy of the Japanese delegates was clear-cut and coherent.  It may be summarized as follows:  the Japanese delegation decided to give its entire support to the Allies in all matters concerning the future relations of Germany and Russia, western Europe, the Balkans, the African colonies, as well as financial indemnities and reparations.  The fate of the Samoan Archipelago must be determined in accord with Britain and the United States.  New Guinea should be allotted to Australia.  As the Marshall, Caroline, and Ladrone Islands, although of no intrinsic value, would constitute a danger in Germany’s hands, they should be taken over by Japan.  Tsingtao and the port of Kiaochow should belong to Japan, as well as the Tainan railway.  Japan would co-operate with the Allies in maintaining order in Siberia, but no Power should arrogate to itself a preponderant voice in the matter of obtaining concessions or other interests there.  Lastly, the principle of the open door was to be upheld in China, Japan being admittedly the Power which is the most interested in the establishment and maintenance of peace in the Far East.

At the Conference, when the Kiaochow dispute came up for discussion, the Japanese attitude, according to their Anglo-Saxon and French colleagues, was calm and dignified, their language courteous, their arguments were put with studied moderation, and their resolve to have their treaty rights recognized was inflexible.  Their case was simple enough, and under the old ordering unanswerable.  The only question was whether it would be invalidated by the new dispensation.  But as the United States had obtained recognition for its Monroe Doctrine, Britain for the supremacy of the sea, and France for the occupation of the Saar Valley and the suspension of the right of self-determination in the case of Austria, it was obvious that Japan had abundant and cogent arguments for her demands, which were that the Chinese territory once held by Germany, and since wrested from that Power by Japan, be formally retroceded to Japan, whose claim to it rested upon the right of conquest and also upon the faith of treaties which she had concluded with China.  At the same time she expressly and spontaneously disclaimed the intention of keeping that territory for herself.  Baron Makino said at the Peace Table: 

“The acquisition of territory belonging to one nation which it is the intention of the country acquiring it to exploit to its sole advantage is not conducive to amity or good-will.”  Japan, although by the fortune of war Germany’s heir to Kiaochow, did not purpose retaining it for the remaining term of the lease; she had, in fact, already promised to restore it to China.  She maintained, however, that the conditions of retrocession should form the subject of a general settlement between Tokio and Peking.

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The Inside Story of the Peace Conference from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.