In truth, the ever-ready command of these raw materials at their sources, which must be neither remote nor subject to potential enemies, is indispensable to the success of Japan’s development.  But for the moment the English-speaking nations have a veto upon them, in virtue of possession, and the embargo put by the United States government upon the export of steel during the war caused a profound emotion in Nippon.  For the shipbuilding works there had increased in number from nine before the war to twelve in 1917, and to twenty-eight at the beginning of 1918, with one hundred slips capable of producing six hundred thousand tons of net register.  The effect of that embargo was to shut down between 70 and 80 per cent. of the shipbuilding works of the country, and to menace with extinction an industry which was bringing in immense profits.

It was with these antecedents and aims that Japan appeared before the Conference in Paris and asked, not for something which she lacked before, but merely for the confirmation of what she already possessed by treaty.  It must be admitted that she had damaged her cause by the manner in which that treaty had been obtained.  To say that she had intimidated the Chinese, instead of coaxing them or bargaining with them, would be a truism.  The fall of Tsingtao gave her a favorable opportunity, and she used and misused it unjustifiably.  The demands in themselves were open to discussion and, if one weighs all the circumstances, would not deserve a classification different from some of those—­the protection of minorities or the transit proviso, for example—­imposed by the greater on the lesser nations at the Conference.  But the mode in which they were pressed irritated the susceptible Chinese and belied the professions made by the Mikado’s Ministers.  The secrecy, too, with which the Tokio Cabinet endeavored to surround them warranted the worst construction.  Yuan Shi Kai[246] regarded the procedure as a deadly insult to himself and his country.  And the circumstance that the Japanese government failed either to foresee or to avoid this amazing psychological blunder lent color to the objections of those who questioned Japan’s qualifications for the mission she had set herself.  The wound inflicted on China by that exhibition of insolence will not soon heal.  How it reacted may be inferred from the strenuous and well-calculated opposition of the Chinese delegation at the Conference.

Nor was that all.  In the summer of 1916 a free fight occurred between Chinese and Japanese soldiers in Cheng-cha-tun, the rights and wrongs of which were, as is usual in such cases, obscure.  But the Okuma Cabinet, assuming that the Chinese were to blame, pounced upon the incident and made it the base of fresh demands to China,[247] two of which were manifestly excessive.  That China would be better off than she is or is otherwise likely to become under Japanese guidance is in the highest degree probable.  But in order that that guidance should be effective it must be accepted, and this can only be the consequence of such a policy of cordiality, patience, and magnanimity as was outlined by my friend, the late Viscount Motono.[248]