revoked the treaty which they had concluded in London, rendering the consent of all Allies necessary to the validity of the document, and decreed that Italy’s abstention would make no difference.  When the instrument was finally signed, Mr. Wilson returned to the United States, Mr. Lloyd George to England, and the Marquis of Saionji to Japan, without having settled any of Italy’s problems.  Italy, her needs, her claims, and her policy thus appear as matters of little account to the Great Powers.  Naturally, the Italian people were disappointed, and desirous of seeking new friends, the old ones having forsaken them.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the consequences which this attitude of the Allies toward Italy may have on European politics generally.  Her most eminent statesman, Signor Tittoni, who succeeded Baron Sonnino, transcending his country’s mortifications, exerted himself tactfully and not unsuccessfully to lubricate the mechanism of the alliance, to ease the dangerous friction and to restore the tone.  And he seems to have accomplished in these respects everything which a sagacious statesman could do.  But to arrest the operation of psychological laws is beyond the power of any individual.  In order to appreciate the Italian point of view, it is nowise necessary to approve the exaggerated claims put forward by her press in the spring of 1919.  It is enough to admit that in the light of the Wilsonian doctrine they were not more incompatible with that doctrine than the claims made by other Powers and accorded by the Supreme Council.

To sum up, Italy acquired the impression that association with her recent allies means for her not only sacrifices in their hour of need, but also further sacrifices in their hour of triumph.  She became reluctantly convinced that they regard interests which she deems vital to herself as unconnected with their own.  And that was unfortunate.  If at some fateful conjuncture in the future her allies on their part should gather the impression that she has adjusted her policy to those interests which are so far removed from theirs, they will have themselves to blame.

FOOTNOTES: 

[194] This clause, which figured in the draft Treaty, as presented to the Germans, provoked such emphatic protests from all sides that it was struck out in the revised version.

[195] In an interview given to the Correspondenz Bureau of Vienna by Conrad von Hoetzendorff.  Cf. Le Temps, July 19, 1919.

[196] The Prime Minister, Salandra, declared that to have made neutrality a matter of bargaining would have been to dishonor Italy.

[197] King Carol was holding a crown council at the time.  Bratiano had spoken against the King’s proposal to throw in the country’s lot with Germany.  Carp was strongly for carrying out Rumania’s treaty obligations.  Some others hesitated, but before it could be put to the vote a telegram was brought in announcing Italy’s resolve to maintain neutrality.  The upshot was Rumania’s refusal to follow her allies.