and to put in her claim at a moment when Europe was being reconstituted, could not have been construed as imperialism.  The other Allies had possessed most of those necessaries in abundance long before the war.  They were adding to them now as the fruits of a victory which Italy’s sacrifices had made possible.  Why, then, should she be left unsatisfied?  Bitterly though the nation was disappointed by failure to have its territorial claims allowed, it became still more deeply grieved when it came to realize that much more important advantages might have been secured if these had been placed in the forefront of the nation’s demands.  Emigration ground for Italy’s surplus population, which is rapidly increasing, coal and iron for her industries might perhaps have been obtained if the Italian plan of campaign at the Conference had been rightly conceived and skilfully executed.  But this realistic aspect of Italy’s interests was almost wholly lost sight of during the waging of the heated and unfruitful contests for the possession of town and ports, which, although sacred symbols of Italianism, could not add anything to the economic resources which will play such a predominant part in the future struggle for material well-being among the new and old states.  There was a marked propensity among Italy’s leaders at home and in Paris to consider each of the issues that concerned their country as though it stood alone, instead of envisaging Italy’s economic, financial, and military position after the war as an indivisible problem and proving that it behooved the Allies in the interests of a European peace to solve it satisfactorily, and to provide compensation in one direction for inevitable gaps in the other.  This, to my thinking, was the fundamental error of the Italian and Allied statesmen for which Europe may have to suffer.  That Italy’s policy cannot in the near future return to the lines on which it ran ever since the establishment of her national unity, whatever her allies may do or say, will hardly be gainsaid.  Interests are decisive factors of foreign policy, and the action of the Great Powers has determined Italy’s orientation.

Italy undoubtedly gained a great deal by the war, into which she entered mainly for the purpose of achieving her unity and securing strong frontiers.  But she signed the Peace Treaty convinced that she had not succeeded in either purpose, and that her allies were answerable for her failure.  It was certainly part of their policy to build up a strong state on her frontier out of a race which she regards as her adversary and to give it command of some of her strategic positions.  And the overt bearing manner in which this policy was sometimes carried out left as much bitterness behind as the object it aimed at.  It is alleged that the Italian delegates were treated with an economy of consideration which bordered on something much worse, while the arguments officially invoked to non-suit them appeared to them in the light