to defend the integrity of states which she had helped
to create while her own frontiers were indefinite.
But in the art of procrastination the Triumvirate
was unsurpassed, and, as the time drew near for presenting
the Treaty to Germany, neither the Adriatic, the colonial,
the financial, nor the economic problems on which Italy’s
future depended were settled or even broached.
In the meanwhile the plenipotentiaries in secret council,
of whom four or five were wont to deliberate and two
to take decisions, had disagreed on the subject of
Fiume. Mr. Wilson was inexorable in his refusal
to hand the city over to Italy, and the various compromises
devised by ingenious weavers of conflicting interests
failed to rally the Italian delegates, whose inspirer
was the taciturn Baron Sonnino. The Italian press,
by insisting on Fiume as a sine qua non of
Italy’s approval of the Peace Treaty and by announcing
that it would undoubtedly be accorded, had made it
practically impossible for the delegates to recede.
The circumstance that the press was inspired by the
government is immaterial to the issue. President
Wilson, who had been frequently told that a word from
him to the peoples of Europe would fire their enthusiasm
and carry them whithersoever he wished, even against
their own governments, now purposed wielding this
unique power against Italy’s plenipotentiaries.
As we saw, he would have done this during his sojourn
in Rome, but was dissuaded by Baron Sonnino.
His intention now was to compel the delegates to go
home and ascertain whether their inflexible attitude
corresponded with that of their people and to draw
the people into the camp of the “idealists.”
He virtually admitted this during his conversation
with Signor Orlando. What he seems to have overlooked,
however, is that there are time limits to every policy,
and that only the same causes can be set in motion
to produce the same results. In Italy the President’s
name had a very different sound in April from the
clarion-like tones it gave forth in January, and the
secret of his popularity even then was the prevalent
faith in his firm determination to bring about a peace
of justice, irrespective of all separate interests,
not merely a peace with indulgence for the strong and
rigor for the weak. The time when Mr. Wilson
might have summoned the peoples of Europe to follow
him had gone by irrevocably. It is worth noting
that the American statesman’s views about certain
of Italy’s claims, although originally laid
down with the usual emphasis as immutable, underwent
considerable modifications which did not tend to reinforce
his authority. Thus at the outset he had proclaimed
the necessity of dividing Istria between the two claimant
nations, but, on further reflection, he gave way in
Italy’s favor, thus enabling Signor Orlando
to make the point that even the President’s solutions
needed corrections. It is also a fact that when
the Italian Premier insisted on having the Adriatic
problems definitely settled before the presentation
of the Treaty to the Germans[213] his colleagues of
France and Britain assured him that this reasonable
request would be complied with. The circumstance
that this promise was disregarded did not tend to smooth
matters in the Council of Five.