Italian government, like that of all other governments, was frankly nationalistic; whether it was also statesman-like may well be questioned—­indeed the question has already been answered by some of Italy’s principal press organs in the negative.[204] They accuse the Cabinet of having deliberately let loose popular passions which it afterward vainly sought to allay, and the facts which they allege in support of the charge have never been denied.

It was certainly to Italy’s best interests to strike up a friendly agreement with the new state, if that were feasible, and some of the men in whose hands her destinies rested, feeling their responsibility, made a laudable attempt to come to an understanding.  Signor Orlando, whose sagacity is equal to his resourcefulness, was one.  In London he had talked the subject over with the Croatian leader, M. Trumbic, and favored the movement toward reconciliation[205] which Baron Sonnino, his colleague, as resolutely discouraged.  A congress was accordingly held in Rome[206] and an accord projected.  The reciprocal relations became amicable.  The Jugoslav committee in the Italian capital congratulated Signor Orlando on the victory of the Piave.  But owing to various causes, especially to Baron Sonnino’s opposition, these inchoate sentiments of neighborliness quickly lost their warmth and finally vanished.  No trace of them remained at the Paris Conference, where the delegates of the two states did not converse together nor even salute one another.

President Wilson’s visit to Rome, where, to use an Italian expression, he was welcomed by Delirium, seemed to brighten Italy’s outlook on the future.  Much was afterward made by the President’s enemies of the subsequent change toward him in the sentiments of the Italian people.  This is commonly ascribed to his failure to fulfil the expectations which his words or attitude aroused or warranted.  Nothing could well be more misleading.  Mr. Wilson’s position on the subject of Italy’s claims never changed, nor did he say or do aught that would justify a doubt as to what it was.  In Rome he spoke to the Ministers in exactly the same terms as in Paris at the Conference.  He apprized them in January of what he proposed to do in April and he even contemplated issuing a declaration of his Italian policy at once.  But he was earnestly requested by the Ministers to keep his counsel to himself and to make no public allusion to it during his sojourn in Italy.[207] It was not his fault, therefore, if the Italian people cherished illusory hopes.  In Paris Signer Orlando had an important encounter with Mr. Wilson,[208] who told him plainly that the allotment of the northern frontiers traced for Italy by the London Treaty would be confirmed, while that of the territory on the eastern Adriatic would be quashed.  The division of the spoils of Austria there must, he added, be made congruously with a map which he handed to the Italian Premier.  It was proved on examination to be identical with