misruled for such a long span of time, may feel tempted one day to recover their own kindred, and what they consider to be their own territory.  And irredentism is one of the worst political plagues for all the three parties who usually suffer from it.  If then Germany and Russia were to combine and attack Poland, the consequences would be serious.  That democratic Germany would risk such a wild adventure in the near future is inconceivable.  But history operates with long periods of time, and it behooves statesmanship to do likewise.

A Polish statesman would start from the assumption that, as Russia and Germany have for the time being ceased to be efficient members of the European state-system, a good understanding may be come to with both of them, and a close intimacy cultivated with one.  Resourcefulness and statecraft will be requisite to this consummation.  For some Russians are still uncompromising, and would fain take back a part of what the revolutionary wave swept out of their country’s grasp, but circumstance bids fair to set free a potent moderating force in the near future.  Already it is incarnated in statesmen of the new type.  In this connection it is instructive to pass in review the secret maneuvers by which the recognition of Poland’s independence was, so to say, extorted from a Russian Minister, who was reputed at the time to be a Democrat of the Democrats.  As some governments have now become champions of publicity, I venture to hope that this disclosure will be as helpful to those whom it concerns as was the systematic suppression of my articles and telegrams during the space of four years.[190]

On the outbreak of the Russian revolution Poland’s representatives in Britain, who had been ceaselessly working for the restoration of their country, approached the British government with a request that the opportunity should be utilized at once, and the new democratic Cabinet in Petrograd requested to issue a proclamation recognizing the independence of Poland.  The reasons for this move having been propounded in detail, orally and in writing, the Foreign Secretary despatched at once a telegram to the Ambassador in the Russian capital, instructing him to lay the matter before the Russian Foreign Minister and urge him to lose no time in establishing the claim of the Polish provisional government to the sympathies of the world, and the redress of its wrongs by Russia.  Sir George Buchanan called on Professor Milyukoff, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and President of the Constitutional Democratic party, and propounded to him the views of the British government, which agreed with those of France and Italy, and hoped he would see his way to profit by the opportunity.  The answer was prompt and definite, and within forty-eight hours of Mr. Balfour’s despatch it reached the Foreign Office.  The gist of it was that the Minister of Foreign Affairs regretted his inability to deal with the problem at that conjuncture, owing to its