But the respite lasted only a few days, at the expiry of which an envoy called on the members of the Polish delegation and reopened the discussion on new lines.  He stated that he spoke on behalf of the Big Four, of whose views and intentions he was the authorized exponent.  And doubtless he thought he was.  But as a matter of fact the French government had no cognizance of his visit or mission or of the conversation to which it led.  He presented arguments before having recourse to deterrents.  Poland’s situation, he said, called for prudence.  Her secular enemy was Germany, with whom it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, ever to cultivate such terms as would conciliate her permanently.  All the more reason, therefore, to deserve and win the friendship of her other neighbors, in particular of the Ruthenians.  The Polish plenipotentiary met the argument in the usual way, where upon the envoy exclaimed:  “Well, to make a long story short, I am here to say that the line of action traced out for your country emanates from the inflexible will of the Great Powers.  To this you must bend.  If it should lead to hostilities on the part of your neighbors you could, of course, rely on the help of your protectors.  Will this not satisfy you?” “If the protection were real it certainly would.  But where is it?  Has it been vouchsafed at any moment since the armistice?  Have the Allied governments an executive in eastern Europe?  Are they likely to order their troops thither to assist any of their protegees?  And if they issued such an order, would it be obeyed?  They cannot protect us, as we know to our cost.  That is why we are prepared, in our interests—­also in theirs—­to protect ourselves.”

This remarkable conversation was terminated by the announcement of the penalty of disobedience.  “If you persist in refusing the proposals I have laid before you, I am to tell you that the Great Powers will withdraw their aid from your country and may even feel it to be their duty to modify the advantageous status which they had decided to confer upon it.”  To which this answer was returned:  “For the assistance we are receiving we are and will ever be truly grateful.  But in order to benefit by it the Polish people must be a living organism and your proposals tend to reduce us to a state of suspended vitality.  They also place us at the mercy of our numerous enemies, the greatest of whom is Germany.”

But lucid intelligence, backed by unflagging will, was of no avail against the threat of famine.  The Poles had to give way.  M. Paderewski pledged his word to Messrs. Lloyd George and Wilson that he would have an armistice concluded with the Ruthenians of eastern Galicia, and the Duumvirs rightly placed implicit confidence in his word as in his moral rectitude.  They also felt grateful to him for having facilitated their arduous task by accepting the inevitable.  To my knowledge President Wilson himself addressed a letter to him toward the end of April, thanking him cordially for the broad-minded way in which he had co-operated with the Supreme Council in its efforts to reconstitute his country on a solid basis.  Probably no other representative of a state “with limited interests” received such high mark of approval.