between the Ruthenians of Galicia and the Poles the Council, taunted by the press with the numerous wars that were being waged while the world’s peace-makers were chatting about cosmic politics in the twilight of the Paris conclave, issued an imperative order that an armistice must be concluded at once.  But the Poles appealed to events, which swiftly settled the matter as they anticipated.  Neither the Supreme Council nor the agents it employed had a real grasp of the east European situation, or of the role deliberately assigned to Poland by its French sponsors—­that of superseding Russia as a bulwark against Germany in the East—­or of the local conditions.  Their action, as was natural in these circumstances, was a sequence of gropings in the dark, of incongruous behests, exhortations, and prohibitions which discredited them in the eyes of those on whose trust and docility the success of their mission depended.

Consciousness of these disadvantages may have had much to do with the rigid secrecy which the delegates maintained before their desultory talks ripened into discussions.  In the case of Poland, as of Rumania, the veil was opaque, and was never voluntarily lifted.  One day[179] the members of the Polish delegation, eager to get an inkling of what had been arranged by the Council of Four about Dantzig, requested M. Clemenceau to apprize them at least of the upshot if not of the details.  The French Premier, who has a quizzing way and a keen sense of humor, replied, “On the 26th inst. you will learn the precise terms.”  But Poland’s representative insisted and pleaded suasively for a hint of what had been settled.  The Premier finally consented and said, “Tell the General Secretary of the Conference, M. Dutasta, from me, that he may make the desired communication to you.”  The delegate accordingly repaired to M. Dutasta, preferred his request, and received this reply:  “M.  Clemenceau may say what he likes.  His words do not bind the Conference.  Before I consider myself released from secrecy I must have the consent of all his colleagues as well.  If you would kindly bring me their express authorization I will communicate the information you demand.”  That closed the incident.

When the Council finally agreed to a solution, the delegates were convoked to learn its nature and to make a vow of obedience to its decisions.  During the first stage of the Conference the representatives of the lesser states had sometimes been permitted to put questions and present objections.  But later on even this privilege was withdrawn.  The following description of what went on may serve as an illustration of the Council’s mode of procedure.  One day the Polish delegation was summoned before the Special Commission to discuss an armistice between the Ruthenians of Galicia and the Polish Republic.  The late General Botha, a shrewd observer, whose valuable experience of political affairs, having been confined to a country which had not much in common with eastern Europe, could be of little help to him in solving the complex problems with which he was confronted, was handicapped from the outset.  Unacquainted with any languages but English and Dutch, the general had to surmount the additional difficulty of carrying on the conversation through an interpreter.  The form it took was somewhat as follows: