their own behoof and without the slightest consideration for the interests of Rumania, had constrained that country to declare war against the Central Empires[145] and had made promises of effective support in the shape of Russian troops, war material of every kind, officers, and heavy artillery.  But neither the promises of help nor the assurances that Germany’s army of invasion would be immobilized were redeemed, and so far as one can now judge they ought never to have been made.  For what actually came to pass—­the invasion of the country by first-class German armies under Mackensen—­might easily have been foreseen, and was actually foretold.[146] The entire country was put to sack, and everything of value that could be removed was carried off to Hungary, Germany, or Austria.  The Allies lavished their verbal sympathies on the immolated nation, but did little else to succor it, and want and misery and disease played havoc with the people.

After the armistice things became worse instead of better.  The Hungarians were permitted to violate the conditions and keep a powerful army out of all proportion to the area which they were destined to retain, and as the Allies disposed of no countering force in eastern Europe, their commands were scoffed at by the Budapest Cabinet.  In the spring of 1919 the Bolshevists of Hungary waxed militant and threatened the peace of Rumania, whose statesmen respectfully sued for permission to occupy certain commanding positions which would have enabled their armies to protect the land from invasion.  But the Duumviri in Paris negatived the request.  They fancied that they understood the situation better than the people on the spot.  Thereupon the Bolshevists, ever ready for an opportunity, seized upon the opening afforded them by the Supreme Council, attacked the Rumanians, and invaded their territory.  Nothing abashed, the two Anglo-Saxon statesmen comforted M. Bratiano and his colleagues with the expression of their regret and the promise that tranquillity would not again be disturbed.  The Supreme Council would see to that.  But this promise, like those that preceded it, was broken.

The Rumanians went so far as to believe that the Supreme Council either had Bolshevist leanings or underwent secret influences—­perhaps unwittingly—­the nature of which it was not easy to ascertain.  In support of these theories they urged that when the Rumanians were on the very point of annihilating the Red troops of Kuhn, it was the Supreme Council which interposed its authority to save them, and did save them effectually, when nothing else could have done it.  That Kuhn was on the point of collapsing was a matter of common knowledge.  A radio-telegram flashed from Budapest by one of his lieutenants contained this significant avowal:  “He [Kuhn] has announced that the Hungarian forces are in flight.  The troops which occupied a good position at the bridgehead of Gomi have abandoned it, carrying with them the men