clauses, formulated reservations. These reservations
were apparently acquiesced in by the members of the
Supreme Council. That, at any rate, was the impression
of MM. Bratiano and Misu. But on the following
day, catching a glimpse of the draft, they discovered
that the obnoxious provisions had been left intact.
Then they lodged their reserves in writing, but to
no purpose. One of the obligations imposed on
Rumania by the Powers was a promise to accept in advance
any and every measure that the Supreme Council might
frame for the protection of minorities in the country,
and for further restricting the sovereignty of the
state in matters connected with the transit of Allied
goods. And, lastly, the Rumanians complained that
the action of the Supreme Council was creating a dangerous
ferment in the Dobrudja, and even in Transylvania,
where the Saxon minority, which had willingly accepted
Rumanian sway, was beginning to agitate against it.
In Bessarabia the non-Rumanian elements of the population
were fiercely opposing the Rumanians and invoking
the support of the Peace Conference. The cardinal
fact which, in the judgment of the Rumanians, dominated
the situation was the quasi ultimatum presented
to them in the spring, when they were summoned unofficially
and privately to grant industrial concessions to a
pushing body of financiers, or else to abide by the
consequences, one of which, they were told, would be
the loss of America’s active assistance.
They had elected to incur the threatened penalty after
having carefully weighed the advantages and disadvantages
of laying the matter before President Wilson himself,
and inquiring officially whether the action in question
was—as they felt sure it must be—in
contradiction with the President’s east European
policy. For it would be sad to think that abundant
petroleum might have washed away many of the tribulations
which the Rumanians had afterward to endure, and that
loans accepted on onerous conditions would, as was
hinted, have softened the hearts of those who had
it in their power to render the existence of the nation
sour or sweet.[144] “Look out,” exclaimed
a Rumanian to me. “You will see that we
shall be spurned as Laodiceans, or worse, before the
Conference is over.” Rumania’s external
situation was even more perilous than her domestic
plight. Situated between Russia and Hungary,
she came more and more to resemble the iron between
the hammer and the anvil. A well-combined move
of the two anarchist states might have pulverized
her. Alive to the danger, her spokesmen in Paris
were anxious to guard against it, but the only hope
they had at the moment was centered in the Great Powers,
whose delegates at the Conference were discharging
the functions which the League of Nations would be
called on to fulfil whenever it became a real institution.
And their past experience of the Great Powers’
mode of action was not calculated to command their
confidence. It was the Great Powers which, for