Much bitterness was generated by those high-handed tactics, whereupon certain slight concessions were made in order to placate the offended delegates; but, being doled out with a bad grace, they failed of the effect intended.  Belgium received three delegates instead of two, and Jugoslavia three; but Rumania, whose population was estimated at fourteen millions, was allowed but two.  This inexplicable decision caused a fresh wound, which was kept continuously open by friction, although it might readily have been avoided.  Its consequences may be traced in Rumania’s singular relations to the Supreme Council before and after the fall of Kuhn in Hungary.

But even those drastic methods might be deemed warranted if the policy enforced were, in truth, conducive to the welfare of the nations on whom it was imposed.  But hastily improvised by one or two men, who had no claim to superior or even average knowledge of the problems involved, and who were constantly falling into egregious and costly errors, it was inevitable that their intervention should be resented as arbitrary and mischievous by the leaders of the interested nations whose acquaintanceship with those questions and with the interdependent issues was extensive and precise.  This resentment, however, might have been not, indeed, neutralized, but somewhat mitigated, if the temper and spirit in which the Duumvirate discharged its self-set functions had been free from hauteur and softened by modesty.  But the magisterial wording in which its decisions were couched, the abruptness with which they were notified, and the threats that accompanied their imposition would have been repellent even were the authors endowed with infallibility.

One of the delegates who unbosomed himself to me on the subject soon after the Germans had signed the Treaty remarked:  “The Big Three are superlatively unsympathetic to most of the envoys from the lesser belligerent states.  And it would be a wonder if it were otherwise, for they make no effort to hide their disdain for us.  In fact, it is downright contempt.  They never consult us.  When we approach them they shove us aside as importunate intruders.  They come to decisions unknown to us, and carry them out in secrecy, as though we were enemies or spies.  If we protest or remonstrate, we are imperialists and ungrateful.

“Often we learn only from the newspapers the burdens or the restrictions that have been imposed on us.”

A couple of days previously M. Clemenceau, in an unofficial reply to a question put by the Rumanian delegation, directed them to consult the financial terms of the Treaty with Austria, forgetting that the delegates of the lesser states had not been allowed to receive or read those terms.  Although communicated to the Austrians, they were carefully concealed from the Rumanians, whom they also concerned.  At the same time, the Rumanian government was called upon to take and announce a decision which presupposed acquaintanceship with those conditions, whereupon the Rumanian Premier telegraphed from Bucharest to Paris to have them sent.  But his locum tenens did not possess a copy and had no right to demand one.[140] Incongruities of this character were frequent.