Toward Italy, who, unlike Russia, was not treated as an enemy, but as relegated to the category of lesser states, the attitude of President Wilson was exceptionally firm and uncompromising.  On the subject of Fiume and Dalmatia he refused to yield an inch.  In vain the Italian delegation argued, appealed, and lowered its claims.  Mr. Wilson was adamant.  It is fair to admit that in no other way could he have contrived to get even a simulacrum of a League.  Unless the weak states were awed into submitting to sacrifices for the great aim which he had made his own, he must return to Washington as the champion of a manifestly lost cause.  On the other hand, it cannot be denied that his thesis was not destitute of arguments to support it.  Accordingly the deadlock went on for months, until the Italian Cabinet fell and people wearied of the Adriatic problems.

Poland was another of the communities which had to bend before Anglo-Saxon will, represented in her case mainly by Mr. Lloyd George, not, however, without the somewhat tardy backing of his colleague from Washington.  It is important for the historian and the political student to observe that as the British Premier was not credited with any profound or original ideas about the severing or soldering of east European territories, the authorship of the powerful and successful opposition to the allotting of Dantzig to Poland was rightly or wrongly ascribed not to him, but to what is euphemistically termed “international finance” lurking in the background, whose interest in Poland was obviously keen, and whose influence on the Supreme Council, although less obvious, was believed to be far-reaching.  The same explanation was currently suggested for the fixed resolve of Mr. Lloyd George not to assign Upper Silesia to Poland without a plebiscite.  His own account of the matter was that although the inhabitants were Polish—­they are as two to one compared with the Germans—­it was conceivable that they entertained leanings toward the Germans, and might therefore desire to throw in their lot with these.  When one compares this scrupulous respect for the likes and dislikes of the inhabitants of that province with the curt refusal of the same men at first to give ear to the ardent desire of the Austrians to unite with the Germans, or to abide by a plebiscite of the inhabitants of Fiume or Teschen, one is bewildered.  The British Premier’s wish was opposed by the official body of experts appointed to report on the matter.  Its members had no misgivings.  The territory, they said, belonged of right to Poland, the great majority of its population was unquestionably Polish, and the practical conclusion was that it should be handed over to the Polish government as soon as feasible.  Thereupon the staff of the commission was changed and new members were substituted for the old.[130] But that was not enough.  The British Premier still encountered such opposition among his foreign colleagues that it was only by dint of wordy warfare and stubbornness that he finally won his point.