In order to stifle any velleities of resistance on the part of their governments, they were notified that America’s economic aid, of which they were in sore need, would depend on their docility.  It is important to remember that it was the motive thus clearly presented that determined their formal assent to a policy which they deprecated.  A Russian statesman summed up the situation in the words:  “It is an illustration of one of our sayings, ’Whose bread I eat, his songs I sing.’” Thus it was reported in July that an agreement come to by the financial group Morgan with an Italian syndicate for a yearly advance to Italy of a large sum for the purchase of American food and raw stuffs was kept in abeyance until the Italian delegation should accept such a solution of the Adriatic problem as Mr. Wilson could approve.  The Russian and anti-Bolshevists were in like manner compelled to give their assent to certain democratic dogmas and practices.  It is also fair, however, to bear in mind that whatever one may think of the wisdom of the policy pursued by the President toward these peoples, the motives that actuated it were unquestionably admirable, and the end in view was their own welfare, as he understood it.  It is all the more to be regretted that neither the arguments nor the example of the autocratic delegates were calculated to give these the slightest influence over the thought or the unfettered action of their unwilling wards.  The arrangements carried out were entirely mechanical.

In the course of time after the vital interests of Britain, France, and Japan had been disposed of, and only those of the “lesser states,” in the more comprehensive sense of this term, remained, President Wilson exercised supreme power, wielding it with firmness and encountering no gainsayer.  Thus the peace between Italy and Austria was put off from month to month because he—­and only he—­among the members of the Supreme Council rejected the various projects of an arrangement.  Into the merits of this dispute it would be unfruitful to enter.  That there was much to be said for Mr. Wilson’s contention, from the point of view of the League of Nations, and also from that of the Jugoslavs, will not be denied.  That some of the main arguments to which he trusted his case were invalidated by the concessions which he had made to other countries was Italy’s contention, and it cannot be thrust aside as untenable.

At last Mr. Wilson ventured on a step which challenged the attention and stirred the disquietude of his friends.  He despatched a note[124] to Turkey, warning her that if the massacres of Armenians were not discontinued he would withdraw the twelfth of his Fourteen Points, which provides for the maintenance of Turkish sovereignty over undeniable Turkish territories.  The intention was excellent, but the necessary effects of his action were contrary to what the President can have aimed at.  He had not consulted the Conference on the important change which he was about to make respecting