“I have, however, paid my homage to the Supreme Being, consonant to my own ideas of his agency and perfections; and those who are of opinion that my notions are erroneous, must allow, that he who does what he thinks to be right, and abstains from what he thinks to be wrong, acquits himself equally of moral obligation, whether his opinions are false or true.”
Such are the concluding observations in Dr Hawkesworth’s General Introduction to this work. That they have a most specious and rational aspect, cannot be denied, with the exception of scarcely any thing more than the last paragraph, in which it is implied, most erroneously, that the conviction of being right is a sufficient evidence that one is so,—a sentiment not more certainly the result of ignorance of human nature in its present condition, than it is the potential source of almost every immorality and mischief that have degraded or destroyed our species. But conceding entirely the principles contended for by Dr H., it may be demonstrated, that a directly contrary conclusion is their proper legitimate issue, and that too, independent of any consideration of other parts of our moral system, which, however, it will be found, in point of fact, are more concerned than even our reason in the influence exerted over our conduct. Neither time nor place admits the discussion of the topic; and to the intelligent reader, this will seem quite unnecessary, when he recollects a single principle, and follows it out into its just consequences, viz. That as the Supreme Being is the cause of all things, and is equally wise and benevolent in the dispensation of both evil and good, so is he entitled to the homage, the fear, and love of those whom he has created with faculties competent to the understanding, in any degree, of his ineffable perfections; and in consequence, his actions or dispensations become to them the proper indications of the qualities of mind with which they ought to adore him. It follows, that though alike proceeding from his benevolence or wisdom, good and evil must be differently accepted by them, as really intended for different, though perfectly consistent purposes. The humiliation therefore of affliction, and the fervour of joy, are alike becoming them on different occasions. We find accordingly, that in the constitution he has given us, there is ample provision made for both, and that he acts in perfect consistency with that constitution: And thus we may cordially join in the sentiment of Mr Gibbon (ay, Mr Gibbon!) on another occasion: