be transferred to the candidate who is marked 2 on them; and those below him on all the papers should go up one point in order of favour.  If he stood 3 on a paper, the candidate who was 4 would now become 3.  Another count of first preferences should then be made, and the lowest again thrown out; and so on till one candidate gets an absolute majority.  It is pointed out triumphantly that this plan, which is known as the Exhaustive Ballot, actually saves in this instance all the trouble and expense of no less than three separate elections.  The process of elimination is the same as that adopted in the Hare system, and is little, if at all, better than the Queensland plan in securing the election of the right candidate, while as regards the formation of groups it is worse.  For this plan actually encourages the groups to split up, since if one candidate nominated by a group is thrown out his vote will be transferred to the others.  Therefore the double election is much better than either form of the Advance Vote.  They would do nothing towards restoring the one redeeming merit of the single electorate, of confining representation to the two main parties.  And all other mathematical schemes founded on the a priori assumption that the candidate most favoured by all sections is entitled to the seat are just as objectionable.

The conclusion that must be reached from all these considerations is that, except when there is a single candidate standing in the interests of each of the two main parties, it is impossible to say with the present system who ought to be elected.  The difficulty is one of fundamental principle.  The only way to do justice to both parties is to enlarge the electorates so that each can get its proportionate share of representation, and then to provide such machinery as will allow each party separately to elect its most favoured candidates.  In no other way can the people be induced to organize into two coherent parties.

CHAPTER X.

APPLICATION OF THE REFORM TO AUSTRALIAN LEGISLATURES.

+Federal Legislatures.+—­The keynote of the Australian Federal Constitution, as expressed in the Commonwealth Bill, is full and unreserved trust in the people.  This is in direct contrast with the American Constitution, which seeks to place checks on the people by dividing power among the President, the Senate, and the House of Representatives, and assigning to each separate functions.  Do we fully realize the dangers as well as the glorious possibilities of unfettered action?  Do we sufficiently feel the weight of the responsibility we have undertaken?  In reality we have declared to the world the fitness of the Australian democracy to work a Constitution from which the most advanced of the other nations would shrink!  We do not hesitate to avow our firm belief that there is only one thing that can save the situation.  Unless Australia is to show to the world a warning instead of an example, all her energies must be bent on the formation of two coherent organized parties, dividing each State on national issues, and competing for the support of all classes and all interests in every electorate throughout the Commonwealth.