But in reality it possesses hardly any of the advantages of the French plan.  It is another instance of the danger of neglecting the factor of human nature.  The French do not go to the trouble and expense of a second election for nothing.  Their plan is far the better.  First of all, consider the candidates.  They know well beforehand that unless one of them gets an absolute majority of the votes at the first election they will be put to the expense and delay of a second election, therefore it is to their interest that the number of candidates be restricted.  This tends to keep down the representation to two sections.  Next, consider the electors.  They know also that unless they give a majority of votes to one of the candidates they will be put to the trouble of voting a second time, therefore they will take good care the votes are not split up, even if the candidates wanted it.  What is the result?  Simply that in the vast majority of cases one of the candidates gets a majority at the first election, and no second election is necessary; and, most important of all, the tendency to split up is counteracted.

Now take the Queensland system.  None of these checks operate.  The splitting up into groups is actually encouraged, and it is to the interest of each group to see as many more groups as possible formed, in order to increase its own relative importance, for the delegates of the two strongest groups have a chance of election instead of the strongest group only.

In practice the plan threatens to break down, owing to a practical point being overlooked.  It is evident that the success of the Advance Vote depends on the electors marking all the preferences.  The ballot paper should be made informal unless all the preferences are given.  In Queensland this has not been done, and the consequence is that a large proportion of the electors refuse to give more than one preference.  No more conclusive evidence is needed that the scheme has promoted the growth of factions.  These electors voluntarily disfranchise themselves rather than vote for any of the other candidates, and of course the very object of the scheme is defeated; the successful candidate cannot secure a majority of the votes cast.

+The Exhaustive Ballot.+—­A bill has just been introduced into the Legislative Assembly of Victoria, providing for a further extension of the principle of the Advance Vote.  The plan is favoured by Professor Nanson, and professes to be an improvement on the Queensland plan, although it is only an “instalment of reform” in view of the ultimate adoption of the more perfect Preferential Voting.  The Queensland plan is objected to because all but the two highest candidates are thrown out.  Suppose, for instance, two candidates stand for the weaker party and three for the stronger party, it is quite likely that all the candidates of the stronger party will be thrown out.  Therefore the lowest candidate only of the five should be thrown out.  All his papers should