enter into competition.  The matter is settled by a reference to the whole of the voting papers.  If any unelected candidate now stands first on an absolute majority of all these papers he is elected.  But if not, then the weeding-out process is applied until an absolute majority is obtained.  The candidate who gets the absolute majority is elected.  Should there be another seat, the same process is repeated.  If an absolute majority of the whole of the voters cannot be obtained for any candidate, then the candidate who comes nearest to the absolute majority is elected.”  It will be seen that Professor Nanson proposes to bring to life again all the eliminated candidates, in order to compete against those who have less than the quota.  The proportional principle is then to be entirely abandoned, and the seats practically given to the stronger party, although the minority may be clearly entitled to them.  The vaunted “one vote one value” is also to be violated, because those who supported the elected candidates are to have an equal voice with those still unrepresented.  And finally, the evil is not cured, it is only aggravated, if an eliminated candidate is elected.

+The Hare System is not Preferential.+—­The idea is sedulously fostered that the Hare system is a form of preferential voting, and many people are misled thereby.  The act of voting is exalted into an end in itself.  The most elaborate provisions are now suggested by Professor Nanson to allow the elector to express his opinion only as far as he likes.  The simple and practical method in use in Tasmania of requiring each elector to place a definite number of candidates in order of preference is denounced as an infringement of the elector’s freedom.  Why force him to express preferences where he does not feel any?  The Professor has therefore invented “the principle of the bracket.”  If the elector cannot discriminate between the merits of a number of candidates he may bracket them all equal in order of favour.  Indeed, where he does not indicate any preference at all, the names unmarked are deemed equal.  Therefore, if he does not wish his vote transferred to any candidate, he must strike out his name.  It is pointed out that a ballot paper can thus be used if there is any kind of preference expressed at all, and the risk of informality is reduced to a minimum.  All the bracket papers are to be put into a separate parcel, and do not become “definite” till all the candidates bracketed, except one, are either elected or rejected; the vote is then transferred to that candidate.  And as bracketed candidates will occur in original papers, surplus papers, and excluded candidates’ papers at every stage of the count, the degree of complication in store for the unhappy returning officer can be imagined.