Godkin, an American writer, whose judgments are entitled to respect, has expressed much the same opinion; “the delegate theory,” he says, “has been gaining ground in England, and in America has almost completely succeeded in asserting its sway, so that we have seen many cases in which members of Congress have openly declared their dissent from the measures for which they voted in obedience to their constituents.”

It is one of the greatest merits of the proposed reform that this vexed question of representation or delegation would be definitely settled.  For, although the area of independent action is enlarged, definite limits are set to it.

+Possible Objections.+—­We may now reply to some objections which have been or might be urged.  At the outset we would point out that the critics nearly always base their objections on the conditions which have prevailed in the past or do exist in the present chaotic state of parties; and seldom appreciate the fact that they would lose force if a better condition could be brought about.  Let us take the Melbourne Argus report of Professor Nanson’s objections:—­

Professor Nanson pointed out that the scheme depended for its efficacy on the existence of party government, which the Professor was glad to say was being pushed more and more into the background.  He took a practical illustration from the defeat of the O’Loghlen Government in 1883.  In that case, after the election the Government came back with a following of one-tenth.  The other combined party had nine-tenths, and of these a little more than half were Liberals and a little less than half were Conservatives.  He pointed out that under Mr. Ashworth’s system the Liberals would have got the whole of the Opposition seats and the Conservatives none, whereas under any intelligent modification of the Hare system the parties would have been returned in the proportion of five Liberals, four Conservatives, and one O’Loghlenite.  The system contained the evils of the scrutin de liste doubled by being applied to two parties, the evils of the Limited Vote, which had been condemned by all leading statesmen, and it played into the hands of these who were best able to organize.

Take the latter statements first.  The evil of the Block Vote or scrutin de liste is that it gives all the representation to the majority, and excludes the minority; its merit is that it prevents the formation of a number of minorities.  How this evil will be doubled if it is entirely removed by allowing both majority and minority their just share of representation we leave the Professor to explain.  The statement that the scheme would play into the hands of those who are best able to organize is absolutely without foundation.  On the contrary, the organization is automatic.  It would certainly encourage the formation of organizations to influence the policies of the parties, since every organization would be