Mr. Bryce thinks that, “like other crowds, a legislature must be led and ruled.”  And he has formulated a theory which he believes to be “the essence of free or popular government, and the justification for vesting power in numbers.”  “Every question that arises in the conduct of government,” he asserts, “is either a question of ends or a question of means.”  And as the “masses are better judges of what will conduce to their happiness than are the-classes placed above them, they must be allowed to determine ends.”  But, assuming the end to be given, they—­the masses—­should leave to their leaders—­the trained statesmen—­the choice of means.  The defect in this theory is that it depends for its successful operation upon the continued “deference of the multitude for the classes placed above them ... upon the principle of noblesse oblige,” a principle, by the way, derived from feudal monarchy, which has no existence in the United States, and which ought to be considered a misfortune in any free country....

     Mr. Bryce has made a step in advance of Mr Bagehot in trusting the
     people to determine ends, whatever they may be; why not go one step
     further, and trust them to determine all questions of policy?

These are the two opposite points of view.  They are both equally wrong.  The first is simply irresponsible leadership, and the second amounts to the same thing in practice, however much the people may appear to lead in theory.  The true position is that the relation between the representatives and the people is reciprocal.  Both lead and both follow.  The people defer to the representatives, not on account of rank or caste, nor upon the principle of noblesse oblige, but only in so far as the representatives are able to demonstrate their fitness to devise measures for the general welfare.  The people, on the other hand, are the ultimate judges, both of measures and of men.  This mutual action and reaction constitutes the responsible leadership, which is one of the fundamental principles underlying the device of representation.  To it we have already traced the virtue of representation as a social force, capable of moulding national character and of appealing to the higher nature of the people.

An elector who is unable or unwilling to decide grave questions of public policy himself may be a very shrewd judge as to who is best fitted to decide them; and deference to ability is totally different in principle to deference to caste.  In a country in the transitional stage between aristocracy and democracy, his judgment may be based partly on the principle of noblesse oblige; but there is not the slightest reason why in a democratic country he should require the representative to defer to him.  He will merely require a higher standard and a closer and a more constant demonstration that the measures proposed are conducive to the public well-being.  Moreover, it is still necessary that