There is no other alternative; one of the two great parties must yield to any faction which becomes strong enough to hold the balance of power between them, or suffer the inevitable consequences—­instability and impotence of government.

Dr. Snow evidently thought that it is not possible to direct the current of public opinion into exactly two channels.  He certainly had not the slightest idea that it might be a matter of electoral machinery.

Finally, we may quote the opinion of Mr. James Bryce, M.P., whose “American Commonwealth” is one of the most complete studies of the tendencies of democracy in existence.  Comparing the English and American systems, he writes of the former:—­

That system could not be deemed to have reached its maturity till the power of the people at large had been established by the Reform Act of 1832.  For its essence resides in the delicate equipoise it creates between the three powers, the ministry, the House of Commons, and the people.  The House is strong because it can call the ministry to account for every act, and can by refusing supplies compel their resignation.  The ministry are not defenceless, because they can dissolve Parliament, and ask the people to judge between it and them.  Parliament, when it displaces a ministry, does not strike at executive authority; it merely changes its agents.  The ministry when they dissolve Parliament do not attack Parliament as an institution; they recognise the supremacy of the body in asking the country to change the individuals who compose it.  Both the House of Commons and the ministry act and move in the full view of the people, who sit as arbiters, prepared to judge in any controversy that may arise.  The House is in touch with the people, because every member must watch the lights and shadows of sentiment which play over his own constituency.  The ministry are in touch with the people, because they are not only themselves representatives, but are heads of a great party, sensitive to its feelings, forced to weigh the effect of every act they do upon the confidence which the party places in them....  The drawback to this system of exquisite equipoise is the liability of its equilibrium to be frequently disturbed, each disturbance involving either a change of government, with immense temporary inconvenience to the departments, or a general election, with immense expenditure of money and trouble in the country.  It is a system whose successful working presupposes the existence of two great parties and no more, parties each strong enough to restrain the violence of the other, yet one of them steadily predominant in any given House of Commons.  Where a third, perhaps a fourth, party appears, the conditions are changed.  The scales of Parliament oscillate as the weight of this detached group is thrown on one side or the other; dissolutions become more frequent, and even dissolutions may fail to restore stability.  The recent history of the French