But to return to the breach between Grant and Smith, to the exact state of facts which led up to it, and to the immediate pressure which finally brought about Smith’s relief from further command in the field.  Much that is as well forgotten, has been written about this unfortunate episode.  Smith felt to the day of his death that he had been misrepresented to Grant and unjustly injured by his action.  He always contended that the whole truth had not been told, and it must be confessed that no consecutive and exhaustive analysis of the case has ever been made.  Perhaps none can be made.  But from such information as I have been able to gather, I have always supposed that Grant’s action was based upon Smith’s criticisms, exaggerated reports of which were made by certain officers of Butler’s staff with whom Smith dined and spent the night at Fortress Monroe on his way home, that Butler presented these reports in person to General Grant, without the knowledge or concurrence of Meade or Burnside, and made them the basis of a demand for Smith’s immediate relief.  Exactly what took place at the interview must for reasons which will appear hereafter, always remain a matter of conjecture.  It however seems to be probable that had General Smith deferred his leave of absence till he had seated himself firmly in his new command, or had he been sent for and allowed to make his own explanation, he would have been spared the humiliation, which ended his military career, while the country would have continued to receive the assistance of one of its greatest military minds.

General Smith, by his military writings, has not only refuted the unjust criticisms of General Butler’s Book, but he has modestly and conclusively set forth his own military services during the various campaigns in which he took part.  He points out with pardonable pride the friendship which sprang up during the Chattanooga campaign, between himself and General Grant.  He makes it clear that his failure to capture Petersburg was due to a number of causes more or less potential and altogether beyond his control.  First among them was the physical exhaustion of himself and his troops; second, an order which was sent to him through the signal corps from General Butler, who was all day June 15 at Point Lookout Signal Station, to stay his advance; and, third, the failure of General Hancock, who was with the Second Corps within supporting distance, to take up the movement and give the finishing stroke to the day’s work.  To these should be added the defective staff arrangements by which the various forces in the field of operations were controlled, the inadequate strength of Smith’s command, which was inexcusable where such a vast force was within call, the lack of engineer officers and of exact information as to the character of the ground over which the troops were compelled to operate, and the total absence of proper support and co-operation on the part of the Army of the Potomac.  Above all, it should be kept in mind that the enemy held the defensive and had interior lines upon which he could throw his troops from point to point on his threatened front, with greater celerity than the attacking force could be concentrated by outside lines and across wide rivers against him.