He necessarily depended upon the Chief Engineer, and the criticism which was sure to come from others, to gather and sift the data upon which final action must be based.  Thomas was there from the first, able, methodical and invincible, a great field tactician, but not specially distinguished for his knowledge of engineering, grand tactics or strategy.  Sherman came afterwards.  He was bold, active and energetic, and had a fine eye for topography.  He knew as well as anyone what could be done and what could not be done by an army, but he came too late to take part in the original investigations, or to do anything more than to accept the part assigned to him, and from an examination of the ground say whether or not he could carry it out.  The important fact is that Smith was, beyond any question, the first mind among them all for working out just such problems as confronted the leaders of the Union army at Chattanooga, and that task was by common consent assigned to him.  The responsibility was Grant’s.  His judgment and resolution must necessarily decide and execute, but it was Smith’s place to gather the facts and work out the details of one of the most complicated military problems that was ever presented for solution, and it can hardly be too much to say that he discharged his task with such patience, skill and success as to justly entitle himself to be known in history as the Strategist of Chattanooga.  Were his distinguished associates living, it cannot be doubted they would willingly concede that honor to him.  In their official reports and correspondence at the time they went far beyond the usual limit to give him praise, and although Grant finally withdrew his friendship from him, for reasons which will be given hereafter, he never in the slightest degree withdrew or modified the praise he had awarded him for his services in the Chattanooga campaign.

But to return to the details of the plan of operations.  It was Smith who discovered the possibility of turning Bragg’s position on Missionary Ridge, by the Army of the Tennessee.  After personal examination of the lay of the ground he suggested that Sherman’s army coming up from Bridgeport through Lookout Valley should cross to the north side of the Tennessee by the bridge at Brown’s Ferry, and after passing to the east side of Moccasin Point, under cover of the woods, to a position opposite the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, should re-cross the Tennessee River, by a bridge to be thrown under cover of darkness, and land on the end of Missionary Ridge with the obvious purpose of marching along the Ridge and rolling up and destroying Bragg’s army, or taking it in reverse and driving it from its line of supply and retreat.  As early as the 8th of November, Mr. Dana, writing to the Secretary of War, speaks of a reconnaissance made by Thomas, Smith and Brannan on the north side of the river to a point opposite the mouth of Citico Creek, near the head of Missionary Ridge, which he thought at that time “proved Smith’s plan of attack impractical.”  But further investigation proved that a passage could he made higher up the river, and when Sherman was taken to the place that had been selected, examining both the place for the bridge and its approaches, on both sides of the river, with his usual care, he closed his field glasses with a snap and turning to Smith said with emphasis:  “Baldy, it can be done!”