On the other hand, Lee was on the alert with his army of 78,000 men, well and compactly posted in a commanding and almost impregnable position along the wooded heights which overlooked Fredericksburg and the valley of the Rappahannock from the south.  Burnside had 113,000 men of all arms, well supplied and thoroughly organized, commanded by the ablest generals in the service.  His preponderance of force was therefore close to fifty per cent., but unfortunately that was not enough to outweigh the natural and artificial obstacles, the heights, stone walls, entrenchments, open fields and river to be overcome by the advancing army.  The task was a hopeless one from the start, and to make matters worse, Burnside, who at best had but a vague and uncertain comprehension of the work before him, seems to have lost what little head he was endowed with before his operations were fully under way.

The result was unfortunate in the extreme.  Two Grand Divisions succeeded in crossing the river without material opposition, but at once found themselves confronted by difficulties and forces they could not overcome.  Franklin, in compliance with his instructions, took two days to get into position, but when his two corps had reached the place assigned them on the old Richmond Road, with the aid of Smith and Reynolds, he looked over the ground and made up his mind that the only chance of victory was offered by an assault upon the enemy’s right center, with the full force of his two corps, amounting to 40,000 men.  Burnside, at his invitation, came to that part of the field, and after listening to the views of the three generals, either of whom was vastly his superior as a soldier, approved the plan and promised to give a written order for its execution.  Franklin waited all night for the order, telegraphed twice, and finally sent a staff officer for it, but it never came.  Indeed it was never issued but a different order directing him to seize the heights at Hamilton’s House, nearly three miles from his right division, and to keep the whole of his command in readiness to move at once, was sent instead.  Sumner received an order equally inane, in reference to Marye’s Heights.  The resulting operations which should have been carefully co-ordinated and vigorously supported, were weak and indecisive.  As the day wore away Lee took advantage of the delays and the opportunities which they offered him, and assumed the offensive.  There was much severe but desultory and disconnected fighting.  The Union generals with their officers and men did their best, but Burnside was on the opposite side of the river and could neither give intelligent orders nor act promptly upon the suggestions which were sent to him from the field.  There was no chance for maneuvering.  It was from the first head-on, face-to-face fighting with no hope of victory for the assailants.  The Union losses were over 12,500 men killed, wounded and missing, of which 4,962 belonged to Franklin’s Grand Division, while Jackson’s corps which confronted him lost 5,364.