took part three days later in the battle of Antietam, but notwithstanding McClellan’s claim that the battle was a “master piece of art,” neither Smith’s troops, nor the corps to which they belonged, were seriously engaged.  This was not the fault of either Franklin or Smith, both of whom were greatly displeased with the disjointed and irresolute manner in which the Union forces were handled and the battle was fought.  The most that can be said is that both General Smith and his division did all that was asked of them, not only in the battle of Antietam, but in following Lee’s army back to Virginia.  These operations are now justly regarded as reflecting but little credit on the generalship by which the national army was controlled during that period of its history.  While they ended McClellan’s military career, they afforded but little chance for any of his subordinates to gain distinction, and those who escaped responsibility for supporting his policy of delay had good reasons to regard themselves as fortunate.

The withdrawal of McClellan and the accession of the weak and vacillating Burnside to command was followed by a re-arrangement of the Army of the Potomac into three grand divisions, and a re-assignment of leading generals.  Franklin was placed in command of the Third Grand Division, consisting of the First Corps under General Reynolds, and the Sixth Corps under General Smith.  In the abortive Fredericksburg campaign which followed, these corps had the extreme left of the Union line, but it should have been evident from the start that with the opposing armies separated by a broad river occupying a deep valley, from three-quarters of a mile to a mile and a half between the opposite crests, the movement which was to bring on the battle must necessarily be fought under extraordinary disadvantages to the attacking army.  In the mind of those who were to carry out the details of the movements, success must have seemed hopeless from the first.  Burnside was from the beginning of the campaign overcome by the weight of his responsibilities, and between tears at one time and lack of sleep at another, his fatuous mind failed to evolve for itself, or to accept from others a definite and comprehensive plan of operations.  He seemed at successive times to have had hopes of surprising Lee, of breaking his center and overwhelming his left, of seizing two important points in his main line of defence and completely turning his left, but withal it is certain that he gave to none of these operations sufficient attention to justify the slightest hope that it could be successfully carried into effect.