Unfortunately McClellan was in the rear, but Sumner and Heintzelman, corps commanders, were soon upon the ground, and with prudent but ill-timed conservatism declined to sanction the proper movement to reinforce Hancock, for fear that it would bring on a general engagement before the army could be properly closed up and placed in position to participate.  Smith recognizing, the great advantage certain to arise from pushing promptly through the opening he had already found, besought Sumner for permission to go with the rest of his division to Hancock’s assistance, but this was also denied.  As other troops arrived on the field, Smith moved to the right to make place for them, with the hope that he might be permitted to continue his march unobserved till he had come up with his advanced brigade, but orders were sent which arrested him before he had accomplished the object he had in view.  All day long he was held in the leash with certain victory in sight.  McClellan arrived on the field late in the afternoon, but before he could get a satisfactory understanding of the condition of affairs, night came on.  Consequently nothing decisive was done that day and a great opportunity was lost.  The wily Magruder, seeing that his left had been turned, and that his position was untenable, abandoned his works under cover of darkness and fell back towards Richmond.  Obviously this result was due, first, to the fortunate discovery made by General Smith and his engineer, and to the successful turning movement of Hancock, based thereon; and, second, to the certainty that if properly reinforced by the rest of Smith’s division, and by other divisions, if necessary, as it surely would be as soon as the national commander had come to comprehend the real condition of affairs, the Confederate forces would be taken in flank and rear and overwhelmed.

This was Smith’s last chance at anything like independent action.  During the remainder of this ill-starred campaign he played the part of a subordinate division commander, in a large army engaged in a complicated series of movements and battles, and of course had no control over the general plans or operations.  There is no evidence that he was ever consulted by anyone except his corps commander Franklin who was himself also a subordinate.  The army lacking field experience, did not work well together as a whole.  The corps commanders had been selected and appointed by the Secretary of War, without reference to McClellan’s wishes or recommendations.  Several of them were veterans, who received their assignments because of seniority rather than for special aptitudes, and this naturally begot a disposition on the part of the division commanders, who were generally younger and perhaps more ambitious men, to look carefully after their own troops and leave larger affairs to their seniors.  At all events, Smith’s principal care henceforth was to handle his own division and look out exclusively for its requirements, and this he did prudently and well, especially during the Seven days’ battle, and during the change of base from the York to the James River.  His brigades, led as I have pointed out, by very able men, were more or less constantly and successfully engaged.  They took a most creditable part in the battles of Golding’s Farm, Savage Station and White Oak Swamp.