the army, was never repulsed and never failed to accomplish the task before it.  Its “skirmish line” was believed to be “stronger than an old-fashioned line of battle,” and when it covered the advance, the column behind it had to put forth its best efforts to keep up.  From the brigadier general to the lowest private, they not only knew their business, but just when they should be called upon to take the lead.  It was one of the grizzled privates during the pursuit of Lee from the field of Gettysburg, who perceiving that the cavalry was making but poor progress, said from the ranks as General Sedgwick was passing:  “I ’low you want to get to Williamsport tonight, don’t you, Uncle John?” “Yes, my man,” said the General.  “Well, in that case you had better put the Vermont brigade to the front!” The suggestion was at once adopted, and under the sturdy advance which followed the desired camp was reached that night without a check or a halt by the way.

The other two brigades of Smith’s division were commanded, respectively, by Windfield Scott Hancock and Isaac I. Stevens, two soldiers of the highest quality, and both destined to achieve undying fame.  When their subsequent career is considered it may well be doubted if there was ever a division in the Union army commanded by abler men than Hancock, Stevens, Brooks and Baldy Smith.  During the formative period of the Army of the Potomac, when all were drilling, all studying tactics, all teaching guard duty and all striving hard to establish a satisfactory state of military discipline, Smith varied this irksome work by an occasional review, or by the still more exciting exercise of a reconnaissance in force, thus adding practice to precept, and bringing regiments and brigades to act coherently together.  In all this he handled his division skillfully and well, and consequently soon had the satisfaction of showing those in authority over him that it was in admirable spirits and condition.

How far he favored the policy of delay for the purpose of increasing the army’s strength and perfecting its organization is not certainly known, but it must be admitted on his own testimony that he belonged to the coterie of officers who fully trusted and supported McClellan in the determination to make complete preparation before moving against the enemy.  Nor is it known what part he took in the selection of the line of operations ultimately adopted by McClellan for the capture of Richmond.  Perhaps this is not important, for neither the duty nor the responsibility of the choice was his.  It is not likely, however, that he was consulted for his acquaintance with McClellan was not at first close or intimate.  At a later period he joined his friend General Franklin, then generally acknowledged as one of the leading military men of the day, in a letter to the President recommending the transfer of the Army of the Potomac from the vicinity of Fredericksburg to the James River, as near to Richmond as practicable, and urging its reinforcement by all