“After the surrender of Detroit,” said the inhabitants of Niagara in their spirited letter to Sir George Prevost, already quoted (page 279), “the enemy were suffered unmolested to concentrate a large force on the Niagara, at Sackett’s Harbour on Lake Ontario, and at Ogdensburg on the St. Lawrence; they were not interrupted in bringing forward to these places a large quantity of field and heavy artillery, with the requisite supplies of ammunition, and in equipping a flotilla, to dispute with us the superiority of the lakes.  When their preparations were complete—­when our regular and militia forces were nearly exhausted with incessant watching and fatigue, occasioned by the movements of the enemy, which kept them constantly on the alert by uncertainty as to the point of attack—­they at length, on the 13th of October, attacked our line at Queenstown.  The behaviour of both regulars and militia on that memorable occasion is well known to your excellency, and added another wreath to the laurels they had gained at Detroit:  the glories of that day were, however, obscured by the death of our beloved and now lamented chief, whose exertions had prepared the means of achieving this great victory.  This was another triumph for the militia; they had fairly measured their strength with the enemy, and derived additional confidence from the glorious result.  Here was another opportunity that slipped away without being improved:  Fort Niagara was abandoned by the enemy, and might have been with the greatest ease destroyed, and its guns brought away by a trifling force.  It is neither necessary, nor do we feel inclined to enter into the causes why it was not done; we have, however, the strongest reason to believe that, had General Brock survived, it would have been attempted.  In addition to this (as we consider it) capital error, Major Mullaney, and other natural born subjects of his majesty, actually taken in arms as commissioned officers in the service of the United States, were released and allowed to return on parole to that country; and a partial armistice was agreed to, liable to be broken off at thirty hours notice, which could be productive of no real advantage to us, nor give any repose to our harassed and suffering militia, though it enabled the enemy to recruit his strength and organize at will the means of attacking us anew.  He was observed busily and actively employed, throughout a great part of the month of November, collecting boats on the Fort Erie end of the line; and when his preparations were complete, he gave notice of the termination of the armistice on the 20th.”

“When General Wilkinson complains,” observes the British historian James, “that the executive has not rendered ’common justice to the principal actors in this gallant scene,’—­not exhibited it to the country ’in its true light, and shewn what deeds Americans are still capable of performing,’[119]—­who among us can retain his gravity?  ’It is true,’ says the general, ’complete success did not ultimately