The distance by water between Fort George and Kingston is about 160 miles, and from Kingston to Sackett’s Harbour only 35 miles; so that the destruction of the arsenal might have been effected early in September, had not the armistice prevented the attempt.  But, unhappily for the interests of his country and the credit of his own fame, Sir George Prevost disapproved of the proposition, and commanded Major-General Brock to relinquish all idea of the contemplated enterprize, although the official intelligence of the president’s refusal to continue the suspension of hostilities reached him at Montreal on the 30th of August, a day or two before Captain Glegg, with the dispatches and trophies of the capture of Detroit.  At the commencement of the war, a defensive attitude was perhaps excusable, especially as the British cabinet seems to have been anxious to accommodate the differences between the two countries; but after the American government had refused to continue the armistice, it appears to us that Sir George Prevost was pursuing a suicidal course, as to wait for the enemy till he shall have prepared his forces and passed your frontiers, to plunder your towns and occupy your country, is a very recent expedient recognized by no government, and practised by no people of ancient or modern times.  But notwithstanding the delay caused by the armistice, the proposed attack could still have been carried into effect after its cessation; and it was only relinquished by express orders from the commander-in-chief.  We seek not to impugn his motives, as they probably originated in a mistaken sense of duty, and evidently from an impression that to attack the Americans again on their own frontier would be to render the contest more popular among them.  It was under this impression that, in a general order[88] issued at Montreal on the 31st of August, the commander-in-chief was weak enough to offer an indirect apology to the American people for the invasion of their territory at Detroit.  Whether this continued defensive policy was such as, under all the circumstances, ought to have been observed, we leave it to others to determine; but certainly the result did not justify its expediency, and the tree is usually judged of by its fruit.  Forbearance in war, where success is probable, strikes us as a positive evil that a very doubtful good may ensue—­it is seldom properly appreciated; and the governor-general appears to have seen his error when too late, as in the following year he was himself ignobly foiled in an attack on Sackett’s Harbour.  We cannot understand why the attack under Sir George Prevost, in May, 1813, was more politic than it would have been in September the year preceding, under Major-General Brock; and although Captain Glegg met with a very chilling reception from the former officer, yet we would willingly acquit him of any jealous feeling where such important interests were at stake.  At the same time it is due to the memory of this unfortunate