Hull’s behaviour, then, can only be accounted for by the supposition that the boldness of his adversary’s movements led him to believe he had to contend with far greater numbers; or, that having threatened to refuse quarter to the white man found fighting by the side of the Indian, he was apprehensive, in the event of defeat, that this threat would be visited with severe retaliation, particularly by the Indians, whose fury, in a successful assault, it might have been very difficult to restrain.  To their honor, however, be it said, that although they took a few prisoners on the advance, the enemy sustained no loss of life beyond that caused by the British batteries; and in general orders, at Detroit, they were told, that in nothing could they testify more strongly their love to the king, their great father, than in following the dictates of honor and humanity by which they had hitherto been actuated.

“The news of the surrender of Detroit,” says the American historian, Brown, “was so unexpected, that it came like a clap of thunder to the ears of the American people.  No one would believe the first report.  The disastrous event blasted the prospects of the first campaign, and opened the northern and western frontiers of Ohio to savage incursions.

“Previous to the surrender of Detroit, the governors of Ohio and Kentucky, in obedience to the directions of the war department, had detached powerful reinforcements to the aid of General Hull.  Had he deferred the capitulation but a few days longer, his army, Detroit, and the Michigan territory, would have been saved.

“The forces advancing to his support consisted of 2,000 militia, under Brigadier-General Payne, and a battalion of mounted riflemen, under Colonel R.M.  Johnson, from Kentucky; a brigade of Ohio militia, under the orders of Brigadier-General Tupper;[73] and nearly 1,000 regulars, under the command of General Winchester.  They had reached the St. Mary’s River when the news of the capture of Detroit was received.  But for the well-timed arrival of the above force a wide scene of flight and misery, of blood and desolation, must have ensued.  Nearly half of the territory of Ohio must have been depopulated, or its inhabitants fallen victims to the scalping knife.”

“The chagrin felt at Washington,” observes James in his Military Occurrences, “when news arrived of the total failure of this the first attempt at invasion, was in proportion to the sanguine hopes entertained of its success.  To what a pitch of extravagance those hopes had been carried, cannot better appear than in two speeches delivered upon the floor of congress, in the summer of 1812.  Dr. Eustis, the secretary at war of the United States, said:  ’We can take the Canadas without soldiers; we have only to send officers into the provinces, and the people, disaffected towards their own government, will rally round our standard.’  The honorable Henry Clay seconded his friend, thus:  ’It is absurd to suppose we shall not succeed in our enterprize