There was a subdued flutter of excitement as we paraded, for though both our destination and object were unknown, it was clearly understood that the hour of action had arrived.  Everything was moving.  A long cloud of dust rose up in the direction of Springfield.  A column of infantry—­Coke’s Brigade—­curled out of its camp near Spearman’s Hill, and wound down towards the ferry at Potgieter’s.  Eight curiously proportioned guns (naval 12-pounders), with tiny wheels and thin elongated barrels, were passed in a string, each tied to the tail of a waggon drawn by twenty oxen.  The howitzer battery hurried to follow; its short and squat pieces, suggesting a row of venomous toads, made a striking contrast.  As the darkness fell the cavalry column started.  On all sides men were marching through the night:  much important business was toward, which the reader may easily understand by studying the map, but cannot without such attention.

Having placed his army within striking distance of the various passages across the Tugela, Sir Redvers Buller’s next object was to cross and debouch.  To this end his plan appears to have been—­for information is scarcely yet properly codified—­something as follows:  Lyttelton’s Brigade, the corps troops forming Coke’s Brigade, the ten naval guns, the battery of howitzers, one field battery, and Bethune’s Mounted Infantry to demonstrate in front of the Potgieter position, keeping the Boers holding the horseshoe in expectation of a frontal attack, and masking their main position; Sir Charles Warren to march by night from Springfield with the brigades of Hart, Woodgate, and Hildyard, the Royal Dragoons, six batteries of artillery, and the pontoon train to a point about five miles west of Spearman’s Hill, and opposite Trichardt’s Drift on the Tugela.  Here he was to meet the mounted forces from Spearman’s Hill, and with these troops he was next day, the 17th, to throw bridges, force the passage of the river, and operate at leisure and discretion against the right flank of the enemy’s horseshoe before Potgieter’s, resting on Spion Kop, a commanding mountain, ultimately joining hands with the frontal force from Spearman’s Hill at a point on the Acton Homes-Ladysmith road.  To sum up briefly, seven battalions, twenty-two guns, and three hundred horse under Lyttelton to mask the Potgieter position; twelve battalions, thirty-six guns, and sixteen hundred horse to cross five miles to the westward, and make a turning movement against the enemy’s right.  The Boer covering army was to be swept back on Ladysmith by a powerful left arm, the pivoting shoulder of which was at Potgieter’s, the elbow at Trichardt’s Drift, and the enveloping hand—­the cavalry under Lord Dundonald—­stretching out towards Acton Homes.

So much for the plan; now for its execution or modifications.  One main feature has characterised the whole undertaking—­its amazing deliberation.  There was to be absolutely no hurry of any kind whatever.  Let the enemy entrench and fortify.  If necessary, we were prepared to sap up to his positions.  Let him discover where the attack impended.  Even then all his resistance should be overborne.  And it seems now that this same deliberation which was so punctiliously observed, when speed appeared an essential to success, baffled the enemy almost as much as it mystified the troops.  However, the event is not yet decided.