to myself we may as well stay and face it out, whatever happens.’  Indeed, it was an anxious time for such a man.  He had bought the ground, built the house, reclaimed waste tracts, enriched the land with corn and cattle, sunk all his capital in the enterprise, and backed it with the best energies of his life.  Now everything might be wrecked in an hour by a wandering Boer patrol.  And this was happening to a loyal and law-abiding British subject more than a hundred miles within the frontiers of her Majesty’s dominions!  Now I felt the bitter need for soldiers—­thousands of soldiers—­so that such a man as this might be assured.  With what pride and joy could one have said:  ’Work on, the fruits of your industry are safe.  Under the strong arm of the Imperial Government your home shall be secure, and if perchance you suffer in the disputes of the Empire the public wealth shall restore your private losses.’  But when I recalled the scanty force which alone kept the field, and stood between the enemy and the rest of Natal, I knew the first would be an empty boast, and, remembering what had happened on other occasions, I thought the second might prove a barren promise.

We started on our long ride home, for the afternoon was wearing away and picket lines are dangerous at dusk.  The military situation is without doubt at this moment most grave and critical.  We have been at war three weeks.  The army that was to have defended Natal, and was indeed expected to repulse the invaders with terrible loss, is blockaded and bombarded in its fortified camp.  At nearly every point along the circle of the frontiers the Boers have advanced and the British retreated.  Wherever we have stood we have been surrounded.  The losses in the fighting have not been unequal—­nor, considering the numbers engaged and the weapons employed, have they been very severe.  But the Boers hold more than 1,200 unwounded British prisoners, a number that bears a disgraceful proportion to the casualty lists, and a very unsatisfactory relation to the number of Dutchmen that we have taken.  All this is mainly the result of being unready.  That we are unready is largely due to those in England who have endeavoured by every means in their power to hamper and obstruct the Government, who have scoffed at the possibility of the Boers becoming the aggressors, and who have represented every precaution for the defence of the colonies as a deliberate provocation to the Transvaal State.  It is also due to an extraordinary under-estimation of the strength of the Boers.  These military republics have been for ten years cherishing vast ambitions, and for five years, enriched by the gold mines, they have been arming and preparing for the struggle.  They have neglected nothing, and it is a very remarkable fact that these ignorant peasant communities have had the wisdom and the enterprise to possess themselves of good advisers, and to utilise the best expert opinion in all matters of armament and war.