to resist the capture of the hill.  A short sharp skirmish followed, in which we lost a few horses and men, and claim to have killed six Boers, and which was terminated after half an hour by the arrival of the leading Infantry battalion—­the Royal Welsh Fusiliers.  During the day the occupation was completed, and the brigades of Generals Wynne, Coke, and Barton, then joining Warren’s Division with the Artillery, entrenched themselves strongly and bivouacked on the hill.  Meanwhile Lyttelton’s Division marched from its camp in the Blue Krantz Valley, east of Chieveley, along the valley to a position short of the eastern spurs of Hussar Hill.  These spurs are more thickly wooded and broken than the rest of the hill, and about four o’clock in the afternoon some hundred Boers established themselves among the rocks and opened a sharp fire.  They were, however, expelled from their position by the Artillery and by the fire of the advanced battalions of Lyttelton’s Division operating from the Blue Krantz Valley.

During the 15th and 16th a desultory artillery duel proceeded on both sides with slight loss to us.  The water question presented some difficulty, as the Blue Krantz River was several miles from Hussar Hill and the hill itself was waterless.  A system of iron tanks mounted on ox waggons was arranged, and a sufficient though small supply maintained.  The heavy artillery was also brought into action and strongly entrenched.  The formidable nature of the enemy’s position and the evident care with which he had fortified it may well have added to the delay by giving cause for the gravest reflection.

On the afternoon of the 16th Sir Redvers Buller resolved to plunge, and orders were issued for a general advance at dawn.  Colonel Sandbach, under whose supervision the Intelligence Department has attained a new and a refreshing standard of efficiency, made comprehensive and, as was afterwards proved, accurate reports of the enemy’s strength and spirit, and strongly recommended the attack on the left flank.  Two hours before dawn the army was on the move.  Hart’s Brigade, the 6-inch and other great guns at Chieveley, guarded Railhead.  Hlangwani Hill, and the long line of entrenchments rimming the Green Hill, were masked and fronted by the display of the field and siege batteries, whose strength in guns was as follows: 

Guns
Four 5-inch siege guns.......................... 4
Six naval twelve-pounder long-range guns........ 6
Two 4.7-inch naval guns......................... 2
One battery howitzers........................... 6
One battery corps artillery (R.F.A.)............ 6
Two brigade divisions R.F.A ....................36
One mountain battery............................ 6
—­
66

and which were also able to prepare and support the attack on Cingolo Neck and Monte Cristo Ridge.  Cingolo Ridge itself, however, was almost beyond their reach.  Lyttelton’s Division with Wynne’s Fusilier Brigade was to stretch out to the eastward and, by a wide turning movement pivoting on the guns and Barton’s Brigade, attack the Cingolo Ridge.  Dundonald’s Cavalry Brigade was to make a far wider detour and climb up the end of the ridge, thus making absolutely certain of finding the enemy’s left flank at last.