We sailed again on the 12th, and I was then first acquainted with the particulars of our voyage by Captain Wallis, who gave me a copy of his instructions, and appointed Port Famine, in the Streight of Magellan, to be the place of rendezvous, if we should happen to be separated.

I was now convinced that I had been sent upon a service to which my vessel and her equipment were by no means equal, but I determined at all events to perform it in the best manner I was able.

We proceeded on our voyage without any remarkable event till we anchored off Cape Virgin Mary, where we saw the Patagonians, of which I have given some account in a letter to Dr Matty, which was published in the sixtieth volume of the Transactions of the Royal Society, and which it is not necessary here to repeat, as it is in general the same as those which have been given by Commodore Byron and Captain Wallis.

When we entered the Streight, I was ordered to keep ahead of the Dolphin and the store-ship, to pilot them through the shoals; but my ship worked so ill, that we could but very seldom make her tack without the help of a boat to tow her round:  However, with much labour, and at no inconsiderable risk, we anchored in Port Famine, on Friday the 26th of December.  At this place we unhung our rudder, and added a piece of wood to it, in hopes that by making it broader, we should obtain some advantage in working the ship; in which, however, we were altogether disappointed.

After many difficulties and dangers, we got into Island Bay on the 17th of February; and before we made sail again, I represented the condition of my ship by letter to Captain Wallis, and requested him to consider what was best for his majesty’s service, whether she should be dismissed, or continue the voyage.  Captain Wallis replied, that as the lords of the Admiralty had ordered the Swallow on this service, with the nature of which I was well acquainted, he did not think himself at liberty to alter her destination.[54]

[Footnote 54:  This seems quite irrational.  Would Captain W. have thought himself bound “to his destination,” in circumstances, which, to the judgment of his own mind, and in the unanimous opinion of his officers, rendered success beyond the accomplishment of human agents?  Surely not—­Then why judge by any other rule than that of practicability, when another person, one under his command, was concerned?  Some discretionary power is obviously implied in every system of orders intended for rational and accountable beings.  The use made of it is one of the data, on which the determination of the degrees of merit or demerit as to conduct, must be founded.  On no other principle than one involving some liberty, nay some duty of judging, can the intelligence of mankind be availing in the execution of projects.  Divine authority alone, unequivocally made known, can dispense with acquiescence to the demands of reason, or render inefficient the most glaringly insuperable difficulties.