will want his immediate advisers to share his political point of view; and it is always possible that in electing him the voters will make a mistake and choose an incompetent and irresponsible person.  An incompetent or disloyal executive could undoubtedly under such a system do much to disorganize the public service; but what will you have?  There can be no efficiency without responsibility.  There can be no responsibility without authority.  The authority and responsibility residing ultimately in the people must be delegated; and it must not be emasculated in the process of delegation.  If it is abused, the people should at all events be able to fix the offense and to punish the offender.  At present our administration is organized chiefly upon the principle that the executive shall not be permitted to do much good for fear that he will do harm.  It ought to be organized on the principle that he shall have full power to do either well or ill, but that if he does do ill, he will have no defense against punishment.  The principle is the same as it is in the case of legislative responsibility.  If under those conditions the voters should persist in electing incompetent or corrupt executives, they would deserve the sort of government they would get and would probably in the end be deprived of their vote.

A system of local government, designed for concentrating power and responsibility, might, consequently, be shaped along the following general lines.  Its core would be a chief executive, elected for a comparatively long term, and subject to recall under certain defined conditions.  He would be surrounded by an executive council, similar to the President’s Cabinet, appointed by himself and consisting of a Controller, Attorney General, Secretary of State, Commissioner of Public Works, and the like.  So far his position would not differ radically from that of the President of the United States, except that he would be subject to recall.  But he would have the additional power of introducing legislation into a legislative council and, in case his proposed legislation were rejected or amended in an inacceptable manner, of appealing to the electorate.  The legislative council would be elected from large districts and, if possible, by some cumulative system of voting.  They, also, might be subject to recall.  They would have the power, dependent on the governor’s veto, of authorizing the appropriation of public money and, also, of passing on certain minor classes of legislation—­closely associated with administrative functions.  But in relation to all legislation of substantial importance express popular approval would be necessary.  The chief executive should possess the power of removing any administrative official in the employ of the state and of appointing a successor.  He would be expected to choose an executive council who agreed with him in all essential matters of public policy, just as the President is expected to appoint his Cabinet.