powers would have wrecked the whole American political system.  On the other hand, the disadvantages of such a system—­its division of responsibility and the possible lack of cooeperation among the several departments—­were mitigated to a considerable, if not to a sufficient, extent.  National parties came into existence with the function of assuming a responsibility which no single group of Federal officials possessed; and in their management of national affairs, the partisan leaders were prompted by a certain amount of patriotism and interest in the public welfare.  Even at Washington the system works badly enough in certain respects; but in general the dominant party can be held to a measure of responsibility; and effective cooeperation is frequently obtained in matters of foreign policy and the like through the action of patriotic and disinterested motives.

In the state governments the advantages of a system of checks and balances were of small importance, while its disadvantages were magnified.  The state governments had no reason to sacrifice concentrated efficiency to safety, because in a Federal organization the temporary exercise of arbitrary executive or legislative power in one locality would not have entailed any irretrievable consequences, and could not impair the fundamental integrity of the American system.  But if a state had less to lose from a betrayal by a legislature or an executive of a substantially complete responsibility for the public welfare, it was not protected to the same extent as the central government against the abuses of a diffused responsibility.  In the state capitals, as at Washington, the national parties did, indeed, make themselves responsible for the management of public affairs and for the harmonious cooeperation of the executive and the legislature; but in their conduct of local business the national parties retained scarcely a vestige of national patriotism.  Their behavior was dictated by the most selfish factional and personal motives.  They did, indeed, secure the cooeperation of the different branches of the government, but largely for corrupt or undesirable purposes; and after the work was done the real authors of it could hide behind the official division of responsibility.

If the foregoing analysis is correct, the partial failure of American state governments is to be imputed chiefly to their lack of a centralized responsible organization.  In their case a very simple and very efficient legislative and administrative system is the more necessary, because only through such a machinery can the local public spirit receive any effective expression.  It can hardly be expected that American citizens will bring as much public spirit to their local public business as to the more stirring affairs of the whole nation; and what local patriotism there is should be confronted by no unnecessary obstacles.  If a mistake or an abuse occurs, the responsibility for it should be unmistakable and absolute, while if a reform candidate or party is victorious, they should control a machinery of government wholly sufficient for their purposes.