the Social Democratic party in Germany is every year becoming less revolutionary and more national in its outlook.  But at present little attempt is being made at conciliation; and the attitude of the ruling classes is such that in the near future none is likely to be made.  In this respect they are false to the logic of the origin of German political unity.  The union was accomplished with the assistance of the democracy and on a foundation of universal suffrage.  As Germany has become more of a nation, the democracy has acquired more substantial power; but its increase in numbers and weight has not been accompanied by any increase of official recognition.  The political organization of Germany is consequently losing touch with those who represent one essential aspect of the national growth.  It behooves the ruling classes to tread warily, or they may have to face a domestic opposition more dangerous than any probable foreign opposition.

The situation is complicated by the dubious international standing of the German Empire.  She is partly surrounded by actual and possible enemies, against whom she can make headway only by means of continuous vigilance and efficient leadership; while at the same time her own national ambitions still conflict in some measure with the interests of her neighbors.  Her official foreign policy since 1872 has undoubtedly been determined by the desire to maintain the peace of Europe under effective guarantees, because she needed time to consolidate her position and reap the advantages of her increasing industrial efficiency; but both German and European statesmen are none the less very conscious of the fact that the German Empire is the European Power which has most to gain in Europe from a successful war.  Some Frenchmen still cherish plans of revenge for 1870; but candid French opinion is beginning to admit that the constantly increasing resources of Germany in men and money make any deliberate policy of that kind almost suicidal.  France would lose much more by a defeat than she could gain from a victory, and the fruits of victory could not be permanently held.  Italy, also, has no unsatisfied ambition which a war could gratify, except the addition of a few thousand Austrian-Italians to her population.  Russia still looks longingly toward Constantinople; but until she has done something to solve her domestic problem and reorganize her finances, she needs peace rather than war.  But the past successes of Germany and her new and increasing expansive power tempt her to cherish ambitions which constitute the chief menace to the international stability of Europe.  She would have much to lose, but she would also have something to gain from the possible disintegration of Austria-Hungary.  She has possibly still more to gain from the incorporation of Holland within the Empire.  Her increasing commerce has possessed her with the idea of eventually disputing the supremacy of the sea with Great Britain.  And she unquestionably expects to profit in Asia Minor