to 1851 is usually described as a country squire, possessed by obscurantist mediaeval ideas wholly incompatible with his own subsequent policy.  But while there are many superficial contradictions between the country squire of 1848 and the Prussian Minister and German Chancellor, the really peculiar quality of Bismarck’s intelligence was revealed in his ability to develop a constructive German national policy out of the prejudices and ideas of a Prussian “junker.”  Bismarck, in 1848, was primarily an ardent Prussian patriot who believed that the monarchy was divinely authorized to govern the Prussian people, and that any diminution of this responsibility was false in principle and would be baleful in its results.  These ideas led him, in 1848, to oppose the constitution, granted by Frederick William IV and to advocate the repression of all revolutionary upheavals.  He never essentially departed from these principles; but his experience gradually taught him that they were capable of a different and more edifying application.  The point of view from which his policy, his achievements, and his career can best be understood is that of a patriotic Prussian who was exclusively, intelligently, and unscrupulously devoted to the welfare (as he conceived it) of his country and his king.  As a loyal Prussian he wished to increase Prussian influence among the other German states, because that was the only way to improve her standing and greatness as a European Power; and he soon realized that Austria constituted the great obstacle to any such increase of Prussian influence.  He and he only drew the one sufficient inference from this fact.  Inasmuch as Prussia’s future greatness and efficiency depended absolutely on the increase of her influence in Germany, and inasmuch as Austria barred her path, Prussia must be prepared to fight Austria, and must make every possible provision, both diplomatic and military, to bring such a war to a successful issue.  Such a purpose meant, of course, the abandonment of the policy which Prussia had pursued for a whole generation.  The one interest which Bismarck wanted the Prussian government to promote was the Prussian interest, no matter whether that interest meant opposition to the democracy or cooeperation therewith; and the important point in the realization of this exclusive policy is that he soon found himself in need of the help of the German democratic movement.  His resolute and candid nationalism in the end forced him to enter into an alliance with the very democracy which he had begun by detesting.

It must be admitted, also, that he had in the beginning reason to distrust the Prussian and the German democracy.  The German radicals had sought to compass the unification of Germany by passing resolutions and making speeches; but such methods, which are indispensable accessories to the good government of an established national community, were utterly incompetent to remove the obstacles to German unity.  These obstacles consisted in the