This famine was met by Government grants; by the contributions from the London Tavern Committee; the Dublin Mansion House Committee, and, to a limited extent, by private charity.[37] In June, 1822, Parliament voted L100,000 “for the employment of the poor in Ireland, and other purposes relating thereto, as the exigency of affairs may require.”  And in July, L200,000, “to enable His Majesty to take such measures as the exigency of affairs may require.”  The London Tavern Committee, with the aid of a King’s letter, received subscriptions amounting to L304,180 17s. 6d., of which L44,177 9s. was raised in Ireland.  The Dublin Mansion House Committee collected L30,406 11s. 4-1/2d.  Thus, the whole sum from charitable collections was L334,587 8s. 10-1/2d., of which L74,584, Os. 4-1/2d. was raised in Ireland.  This, with the grant of L300,000 from Government, makes a grand total of L634,587 8s. 10-1/2d.  The sum appears to have been quite sufficient, as the London Tavern Committee closed its labours whilst it had yet in hands L60,000, which sum was partly distributed and partly invested in ways considered beneficial to this country.[38]

Every two or three years from 1821 to the great blight of ’45 and ’46, a failure of some kind, more or less extensive, occurred to the potato crop, not merely in Ireland, but in almost every country in which it was cultivated to any considerable extent.  Reviewing, then, the history of this famous root for over a period of one hundred years, we find, that although it produces from a given acreage more human food than any other crop, it is yet a most treacherous and perishable one; and it may, perhaps, surprise future generations, that the statesmen and landed proprietors of that lengthened period did nothing whatever to regulate the husbandry of the country, in such a way as to prevent the lives of a whole people from being dependant on a crop liable to so many casualties.  Perhaps the social and political condition of Ireland, during these times, will be found to have had something to do with this culpable apathy.

It is commonly assumed that the subjugation of Ireland was effected by Elizabeth, but the submission to English rule was only a forced one; the spirit of the nation was one of determined opposition, which was abundantly shown at Aughrim and Limerick, and on many a foreign field besides.  Great Britain knowing this, and being determined to hold the country at all risks, was continually in fear that some war or complication with foreign powers would afford the Irish people an opportunity of putting an end to English rule in Ireland, and of declaring the country an independent nation.  As progress in wealth and prosperity would add to the probabilities of success in such an event, it was the all but avowed—­nay, truth compels me to say, the frequently avowed policy of England to keep Ireland poor, and therefore feeble, that she might be held the more securely.  For that reason she was not treated as a portion of a united kingdom, but as an enemy who had become England’s slave by conquest, who was her rival in manufactures of various kinds, who might undersell her in foreign markets, and, in fact, who might grow rich and powerful enough to assert her independence.