at Alnwick or some other indifferent place near Scotland.  When this answer reached London, Whitlocke, who had all along, as he tells us, protested that Monk’s object was delay only and “that the bottom of his design was to bring in the King,” repeated more earnestly his former advice that Lambert should be pushed on to immediate action.  “His advice was not taken,” says Whitlocke, “but a new Treaty consented to by Commissioners on each part, to be at Newcastle.”  From about the 20th of November that was Lambert’s headquarters, while Monk, having left a portion of his forces behind him for necessary garrison purposes in Scotland, came on from Edinburgh to establish himself at Berwick with the rest.  He was there before the end of the month.  In the beginning of December 1659, therefore, the two Armies were all but facing each other,—­Monk’s consisting now of about 6000 foot and 1400 horse and dragoons, and Lambert’s of between 4000 and 5000 horse and about 3000 foot:  the excess in horse giving Lambert a great superiority.  At Monk’s back, moreover, there was no effective support in case of failure, unless by that arming of the Scots which he was unwilling to risk, while to back Lambert there were about 20,000 more regulars in England, besides a militia of 30,000, not to speak of the forces in Ireland, and the regiments in Flanders.  Between the two Armies all that intervened to prevent conflict was the Treaty to be resumed at Newcastle.  Monk magnified the importance of that, but took great care to postpone it.  Wilkes, Clobery, and Knight, had not returned from London, and were rather slow to do so and face Monk after their blunder; and the two new Commissioners had not yet been appointed.  Meanwhile letters and messages passed between the two Armies, and there were desertions from the one to the other.[1]

[Footnote 1:  Skinner, 146-158; Phillips, 670-672; Whitlocke, IV. 373-377.]

All this while the London Government of the Committee of Safety had been attending as well as they could to such general business as belonged to them in their double capacity of supreme executive and temporary deliberative.  For, at the constitution of the body on the 26th of October, it had been agreed that they should not only exercise the usual powers of a Council of State, but should also prosecute that great question of the future form of the Government of the Commonwealth which had occupied the late Rump.  They were to prosecute this question in conference, if necessary, with the chief Army officers and others; and, if they should not come to a conclusion within six weeks, the question was to return to the Wallingford-House Council itself.[1]

[Footnote 1:  Letter of M. de Bordeaux to Mazarin of date Nov. 6, 1659 (i.e.  Oct. 28 in English reckoning), in Appendix to Guizot, II. 274-278.]