[Footnote 1:  Ludlow, 639-641; Whitlocke under date April 21, 1659; Commons Journals of April 22; Phillips, 641-642; Guizot, I. 120-128, with Letters of M. de Bordeaux to Mazarin appended at pp. 366-375.]

A week before the Dissolution the Parliament had estimated the public debt, as it would stand at the end of the year then current, at a total of L2,222,090, besides what might be due to the forces in Flanders.  Of this sum L1,747,584 was existing debt in arrears, L393,883 was debt of the Navy running on for the year, and L80,623 was the calculated deficit for the year by the excess of the ordinary expenditure in England, Scotland, and Ireland over the revenues from these countries.  It is interesting to note the particulars of this last item.  The annual income from England was L1,517,275, and the annual expenses in England L1,547,788, leaving a deficit for England of L30,513; the annual income from Scotland was L143,652, but the outlay L307,271 (more than double the income), leaving a deficit for Scotland of L163,619; the annual income from Ireland was L207,790, and the outlay L346,480, leaving a deficit for Ireland of L138,690.  This would have made the total deficit, for the ordinary administration, civil and military, of the three nations, L332,823; but, as L252,200 of this sum would be met by special taxes on England for the support of the Armies in Scotland and Ireland, the real deficit was L80,623, as above.  How to meet that, and the L393,883 running on for the Navy, and the arrears of L1,747,584 besides, and the unknown amount that might be due to the Army in Flanders, was the financial problem to be solved.  Two millions and a half, it may be said roughly, were required to set the Commonwealth clear.[1]

[Footnote 1:  Commons Journals, April 16, 1659.]

The late Parliament having stated the problem, but having had no time to attempt the solution, the responsibility had descended to those who had turned them out.  It was but one form of the enormous and most complex responsibility they had undertaken; but it was the particular form of responsibility that had most to do in determining their immediate proceedings.  Had it been merely the administration that had come into their hands, with the defence of the Commonwealth against the renewed danger of a Royalist outburst at home and inburst from abroad to take advantage of the political crash, the Wallingford-House chiefs would probably have thought it sufficient to constitute themselves into a military Oligarchy for maintaining and carrying on Richard’s Protectorate.  Fleetwood, Desborough, and Lambert would have been a Triumvirate in Richard’s name, and the only deliberative apparatus would have been the general council of officers continued, or a more select Council of their number associated with a few chosen civilians.  The Triumvirs might have given such a form to the constitution as, while securing the real power for themselves, and not abolishing Richard, would have