Redmond neither could nor did ask any man to serve outside Ireland till he was satisfied with the Government’s attitude in regard to Home Rule.  In the first days of the war, however, the critical question for him was to know how his offer of assistance from the Volunteers would be accepted by the Government, and at the outset all promised favourably.  On August 8th a telegram was sent to the Lord-Lieutenant: 

“His Majesty’s Government recognize with deep gratitude the loyal help which Ireland has offered in this grave hour.  They hope to announce as soon as possible arrangements by which this offer can be made use of to the fullest possible extent.”

That unquestionably represented the mind of Mr. Asquith and his civilian colleagues.  But a new power had transformed the Cabinet.  Lord Kitchener, refusing to accept the post of Commander in Chief, had insisted on becoming Secretary of State for War.

No one is likely to underestimate Lord Kitchener’s value at that hour.  But probably no one now will dispute that the political control which this soldier obtained was excessive and was dangerous.  Years of fierce faction had shaken the public confidence in politicians, and a soldier was traditionally above and beyond politics.  But in Lord Kitchener’s case the soldier was certainly remote from and below the regions of statesmanship.  Narrow, domineering, and obstinate, he was a difficult colleague for anyone; and for a Prime Minister with so easy a temper as Mr. Asquith he was not a colleague but a master.  He claimed to be supreme in all matters relating to the Army, and in such a war this came near to covering the whole field of government.  It most certainly covered the question of dealing with the Irish Volunteers and with the Ulster Volunteers, which meant in reality the whole question of Ireland.

Immediately on Lord Kitchener’s appointment Redmond had an interview with him.  Redmond’s report was that he had been most friendly—­and most limited in his expectations.  “Get me five thousand men, and I will say ‘Thank you,’” he had said.  “Get me ten thousand, and I will take off my hat to you.”  Yet the very smallness of the estimate should have been a note of warning to us; it indicated a cynical view of Ireland’s response to Redmond’s public declaration.

On the question of the Volunteers he made friendly promises.  As the Sirdar in Egypt he had been used to giving fair words to native chiefs.  There is not the least reason to suppose that Lord Kitchener would have felt bound to show Redmond his real mind.

The truth was that Lord Kitchener held in respect to Ireland the traditional opinions of the British Army.  Nobody could blame the professional soldier for dislike and distrust of Irish Nationalist politicians generally; but when at such a crisis a professional soldier, by no means conspicuous for breadth of mind, came to hold such a position as Lord Kitchener seized, the result was certain to be disastrous for Irish policy unless Liberal statesmanship exercised a strong control over him.  Neither Mr. Asquith nor Mr. Birrell was likely to do this.