“You will be all right.  You will be no longer cowards.  The cowardice will have been given up.  You will have become men in entrenching yourselves behind the Army.  But under your direction they will have become assassins.”

With these words—­memorable in connection with what happened later, but not in Ulster—­the Ulster leader left the House, followed by Captain Craig.  Friday’s papers were of course full of the debate.  At noon on that day, March 20, 1914, General Sir Arthur Paget, Commander-in-Chief in Ireland, held a meeting with the officers at the Curragh and received the intimation that the majority of them would resign their commissions rather than go on duty which was likely to involve a collision with Ulster.

It seems only fair in dealing with this whole incident to print here an account of what happened, written from the soldier’s point of view, by the man who was the spokesman and leader of the resigning officers—­Brigadier (now Lieutenant) General Sir Hubert Gough.[2]

’"I never refused to obey orders.  On the contrary, I obeyed them.  I was ordered to make a decision—­namely, to leave the Army or ’to undertake active operations against Ulster.’  These were the very words of the terms offered.  As I was given a choice, I accepted it, and chose the first alternative, and as a matter of fact I have a letter in existence written the night before the offer was made by Sir A. Paget to my brother, saying:  ‘Something is up’ (we had been suddenly ordered to a conference).  ’What is it?  If I receive orders to march North, of course I will go.’”

‘All the officers of the 3rd Cavalry Brigade took the same line’ (continues the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian) ’and resigned.  This decision seems not to have been expected by the authorities, and caused great perturbation.  General Gough was urged by Sir Arthur Paget to withdraw the resignation.  Sir Arthur Paget told them that the operations against Ulster were to be of a purely defensive nature.  Unfortunately, Sir Arthur Paget based his appeal on expediency and private interest, and not sufficiently on the call of public duty.  This failed to influence the officers.  They persisted in their resignations, and only finally withdrew them on receiving a written undertaking from the War Office that they would not be again presented with the alternative of resigning or attacking Ulster.’

The Irish Party had no guess at the inner aspect of the occurrence.  Naturally, but regrettably, we were the section of the House which had least touch with what was thought and felt in barrack-rooms and regimental messes.  Naturally, but most regrettably, the opinion of the Army regarded us traditionally as a hostile body; and at this time every effort to accentuate that belief was made by the political party with which the Army had most intercourse and connection.