The Committee stage of discussion lasted beyond the end of the year.  On the finance arrangements Redmond had to face fierce opposition from Mr. O’Brien’s party, which was endorsed by the Irish Council of County Councils.  Here difficulties were inevitable, and attack was easy either for the Unionists, who pressed the argument that Ireland was to be started on its career of self-government with a subsidy of some two millions per annum from Great Britain, or for the O’Brienites, who urged that the country was already overtaxed in proportion to its resources, that it needed large expenditure for development, and that the possible budget indicated by the Bill left no serious possibility for reducing taxes or for undertaking even necessary expenditure.  Redmond, on the other hand, was bound to conciliate the vested interests of civil servants, officials in all degrees, and the immense police force.  Retrenchment on the vast area of unproductive expenditure which Castle government had created could only be hoped for at a very distant date.  He could not therefore promise substantial economy; nor could he argue for a further increase of subsidy without playing into the Tories’ hands.  On all this detail of the measure, the attack in debate was bound to be very powerful.

So far as Great Britain was concerned, the reply of Home Rulers was tolerably effective.  In 1886 it had been feasible to propose Home Rule with an Imperial contribution of two and a half millions.  By 1893 the possible margin had dropped heavily, and Mr. Gladstone had foretold that within fifteen years Ireland would absorb more money for purely Irish services than Irish taxation produced.  This prophecy had been fulfilled to the letter, and everyone saw that to continue the Union meant increasing this charge automatically.  It was better to cut the loss and at least say that it should not exceed a fixed figure.

But in Ireland men dwelt always on the Report of the Financial Relations Commission, which had represented the balance as heavily against England and the account for overtaxation of the poorer country as reaching three hundred millions.  No man quoted this document oftener than Redmond, and none was a firmer believer in its justification.  But he realized, as his countrymen did not, that such a claim could never hope for cash settlement, that its value was as an argument for the concession of freedom upon generous terms.  How could he urge that the terms proposed were ungenerous, when Great Britain offered to pay the cost of all Irish services—­amounting to a million and a half more than Irish revenue—­and to provide over and above this a yearly grant of half a million, dropping gradually, it is true, but still remaining at a subsidy of two hundred thousand a year so long as the finance arrangements of the Bill lasted?

Nevertheless, these arrangements were bad ones, and this was where the Bill was most vulnerable on its merits; for self-government without the control of taxation and expenditure is at best an unhopeful experiment.